Chief Superintendent Lagan of the Royal Ulster Constabulatory, the commanding police official in the relevant geographical area where the events of "Bloody Sunday" occurred, was perhaps the most experienced and knowledgeable security official on the question of who in the Catholic community of Londonderry were responsible and peaceable citizens, as distinguished from habitual rioters. He was fully informed by nicra that the march, protesting internment, on January 30 was to be a nonviolent demonstration by a large number of the peaceable Catholic community. It is significant that based on his special experience with the nicra leadership he believed that if the march were permitted to go unchallenged by the military, it would pose no threat of harm to persons or property.

On January 24, 1972, Chief Superintendent Lagan conveyed these views to Brigadier MacLellan, commander of the brigade unit of the military in the Londonderry area. Lagan testified that he not only urged that the military allow the march to take place without military intervention, but that Brigadier MacLellan completely agreed with him and was going to make this same recommendation to General Ford, the Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland. Lagan had no doubt that hooligans might throw stones and bottles at soldiers patrolling the streets. However this was an almost daily event in Londonderry and he recommended that the army take photographs of such rioters for the purpose of making arrests at a later time. He believed that with the size of the crowd that would be marching--estimated between 2,000 and 20,000 people--only serious violence would result if the soldiers sought to intervene at the time of the march. According to the evidence, MacLellan communicated Chief Superintendent Lagan's recommendation to General Ford but it was rejected by Ford, the Stormont goffernment and higher authorities at Westminister.

Chief Superintendent Lagan also testified that on January 30, before the march, he specifically informed General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan that nicra had assured him that the marchers would turn right on Rossville Street from William Street to avoid any confrontation with the soldiers and police Officers at barrier 14. Nicra wanted to preserve order and maintain the march as a nonviolent demonstration. Indeed, it was essential that the march be nonviolent if nicra was to succeed in its goal of leading a digniWed and effective demonstration against internment.

General Ford testified before Lord Widgery that, although it was the view of the military that the bulk of the marchers would be peaceable, the sponsors of the march would not be able to control the hooligan group which was expected to attack the soldiers with an assortment of dangerous missiles, including explosive nail bombs.

There was no dispute in the testimony that on numerous occasions prior to January 30 groups of rowdy young men threw nail bombs at soldiers. A nail bomb is a home made device about the size of a baseball which has a gelignite explosive core. Imbedded nails blow out like shrapnel when the bomb explodes after its fuse is lit. However Chief Superintendent Lagan was convinced that no nail bombs or any weapons would be used by the ira or by any civilians during the nicra march, if the army caused no confrontation.

General Ford also testified that the army believed that a large number of ira terrorists, armed with guns, would be included among the marchers, and that they would use the occasion of the march to shoot at and kill soldiers. Accordingly, General Ford had decided, in consultation with the Stormont goffernment, that the march had to be contained within the Bogside area, and that if any acts of violence were committed against the security forces, arrest operations should be put in motion to take into custody those involved in the violence. The military position was that unless such arrests were made, there would be a breakdown in the respect for law and a continuing threat of violence to the commercial and Protestant communities of Londonderry. General Ford was determined to prevent the marchers from reaching their destination, Guild Hall, in the City Center of Londonderry.

On January 25, General Ford put Brigadier MacLellan in charge of the operation and ordered him to prepare a detailed plan. The brigade commander's plan required the erection of 26 barriers which sealed off the Bogside and Creggan Estates area from the rest of the city. Each barrier was to be manned by an army platoon assisted by ruc Officers. The march was not to be interfered with so long as it was contained in the Bogside. The plan called for the march to be dealt with in as low a key as possible for as long as possible. However, in the event that violence occurred at any barrier which threatened the soldiers or the police Officers with physical harm or being offerrun by the marchers, the soldiers were to respond initially with rubber bullets, water canon and, as a last resort, cs gas.

The troops at the barriers were to be proffided by units regularly under the command of the local infantry brigade. But for this particular march the orders called for reinforcements which included the First Battalion Parachute Regiment (referred to in the testimony and in Lord Widgery's report as 1 Para); the First Battalion King's own Border Regiment and two companies of the Third Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The total number of troops assembled at the borders of the Bogside on Sunday, January 30, 1972 was 1800.

A special proffision in the brigade orders dealt with the treatment of "hooliganism." The plan proffided: "An arrest force is to be held centrally behind the check points and launched in a scoopup operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as possible." It assigned 1 Para to this specific task and proffided that 1 Para "Maintain a Brigade Arrest Force to conduct a scoopup operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible. (a) This operation will only be launched either in whole or in part on the orders of the Brigade Commander. (b) . . . . . . . (c) The scoopup operation is likely to be launched on two axes one directly toward hooligan activity and in the area of William Street--Little Diamond, and one towards the area of William Street--Little James Street (d) It is expected that the arrest operation will be conducted on foot."

Lord Widgery in his report quotes this portion of the brigade plan. But, strangely, the "(c)" portion of these arrest instructions for 1 Para is omitted by him. This omission becomes especially relevant to the issue of whether the paratroopers acted beyond their orders, when the arrest plan was put in operation, by charging further into the Bogside area than was either contemplated by the brigade commander's plan or by any order which may have been given to them to begin the scoopup operation.

At this point it is important to examine the special assignment to 1 Para for this scoopup arrest operation. Such an examination is relevant to the issue of whether the Army knowingly accepted the risk of civilian casualties on January 30. If the Army was sincere in its stated objective to engage in a low key operation for as long as possible and to undertake an arrest operation only under special circumstances limited to hooligans, one must seriously ask the question of why this arrest operation was assigned to the paratroopers. It is clear from the testimony that the brigade commander, himself, did not make this assignment. He testified that General Ford was responsible for it.

Although Lord Widgery prevented counsel for the families of the dead and wounded from probing fully into the prior experience and reputation of this particular paratroop regiment, enough evidence did come before the Tribunal to indicate, at the least, that there was a basis for strong suspicion that 1 Para was unsuited for military action against a demonstrating civilian population, and, at the most, that 1 Para was a hardened, brutal "killer" company that a commander might use effectively in jungle warfare against a dangerous enemy, but which, if unleashed against a hostile civilian population, would use their weapons recklessly, without much concern for the killing or wounding of unarmed civilians. The commanding Officer of this regiment admitted in his testimony that serious allegations had been made against his paratroop company in other towns in Northern Ireland, such as the blinding of an elderly lady in her home by one of the paras shooting a rubber bullet at close range into her face, and the brutal use of gun butts on civilians by some paras while others held the civilians in a defenseless position.

The commanding Officer testified that a military investigation initiated by him had cleared his men of these charges. But a newspaper story was read into the record, quoting British military Officers from other units as calling for the remoffal of 1 Para from Northern Ireland, claiming that this regiment of paratroopers had undone in a very short time much of the good community relations which the military had developed offer months of eVort by the regular military units in Northern Ireland.

Of course the Tribunal could not and should not have established the truth or falsity of such charges. They are mentioned here not for the purpose of supporting their validity. Their basic signiWcance to the inquiry, however, is that they clearly establish that 1 Para had a dubious reputation as to brutality and indiVerence to the safety of Catholic civilians. This reputation alone, had to be considered in determining whether bringing in 1 Para for the scoopup operation created an unacceptable risk in the delicate situation which confronted the military in the Bogside on Sunday, January 30. Lord Widgery does not directly refer to this reputation of 1 Para in his report, but he does allude to the claim made by the families' counsel that 1 Para was known as the "roughest and toughest unit in Northern Ireland," without indicating any disagreement with that characterization. Also, in dealing with the question of why the paratroopers Wred at civilians he states:

"In 1 Para the soldiers are trained to go for the gunman and make their decisions quickly. In these circumstances it is not remarkable that mistakes were made and some innocent civilians hit."

Again in his conclusions, he states, referring to 1 Para,

"Their training made them aggressive and quick in decision and some showed more restraint in opening Wre than others."

Even on Lord Widgery's own characterization of the soldiers in 1 Para, their assignment to the scoopup operation had to be recognized by the commanding Officers in charge as causing a dangerous risk of harm to the civilian population.

The army's explanation of 1 Para's assignment to this scoopup operation seems exceedingly weak. Lord Widgery restates it in his report as follows:

"1 Para was chosen for the arrest role because it was the only experienced uncommitted battalion in Northern Ireland. Other experienced units were stationed in Londonderry as part of the normal content of 8th infantry brigade but being committed to barrier and other duties they were not available for use as an arrest force."

The thinness of this explanation is apparent. The Army made preparations for the march on January 30 considerably in advance of that day. It was General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan who utilized the other troops at the barriers and especially assigned 1 Para for the arrest operation. The regular troops of the 8th Infantry Brigade, which had been stationed around the Bogside area for a considerable length of time, knew the geography of the Bogside and had experience with rioters in the past. Because of the number of civilians in the streets of the Bogside on January 30, these regular troops would have been much better suited for the arrest operation.

The paratroopers could have been assigned to the barriers armed with baton guns, which Wre rubber bullets, and also with cs gas. Perhaps the soundest military decision would have been to not have 1 Para in Londonderry at all that day. In judging whether the military decision to use 1 Para for the arrest operation was reckless, an analogy may be helpful. The United States Special Forces, the "Green Berets," like 1 Para are trained to kill and to be fast on the trigger. Their mission is to combat a dangerous enemy, not a civilian population. Using the "Green Berets" for the "scoopup" of civilians at the Mayday demonstrations in Washington, D.C. in 1971 would have been similar to the use of 1 Para in Londonderry on January 30, with possibly the same tragic consequences.