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RESTRICTIONS
ON THE INDEPENDENT LEGAL PROFESSION IN AZERBAIJAN
September
1999
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
I.
Introduction
II.
Background
A.
Azerbaijan's Place in the World
B. Civil Society and Human Rights
C. The Azerbaijani Criminal Justice System
III.
International Standards for the Protection of Lawyers
IV.
State Efforts to Control Defense Attorneys
A.
Collegium Control of the Defense Bar
B. Attacks and Intimidation Directed at
Independent Lawyers
C. The Clampdown on Independent Criminal
Lawyers
D. The Case of Aslan Ismailov
V.
On the Horizon
A.
Draft Law on the Bar
B. The Association of Lawyers of Azerbaijan
VI.
Recommendations
Introduction
In light of Azerbaijan's application to join the Council
of Europe, this report highlights the urgent need to
support the efforts of lawyers and human rights defenders
in Azerbaijan to create a vigorous, independent legal
community in Azerbaijan. By publicizing their efforts
and creating opportunities for them to make their case
abroad, the international community can promote independence
of the bar, defense of human rights, and the rule of
law in Azerbaijan. This report discusses the official
restrictions and intense political pressure placed on
lawyers who attempt to practice free of undue government
influence. It illustrates the significant impact of
these restrictions on human rights and the Azerbaijani
criminal justice system, and suggests how the international
community, including intergovernmental organizations,
governments, and businesses, can engage to support the
local fight against the restrictions.
The International League for Human Rights, now in its
58th year, a non-governmental organization with special
consultative status at the UN ECOSOC, has long worked
to "defend the defenders" and ensure that
lawyers and other human rights advocates who accept
the risk to defend others are themselves protected from
harassment or attack by governments or violent groups
in society.
The League views a strong, independent, private bar
as an essential component of the rule of law and recognizes
that attorneys have the greatest stake in legal reform
in order to protect their clients under the law.
II.
Background
A. Azerbaijan's Place in the World
Azerbaijan is an oil-rich former Soviet republic located
on the Caspian Sea that obtained its independence in
August 1991. It has a population of nearly eight million.
Azerbaijan borders on the Russian Federation to the
North; on the Republic of Armenia to the West; on the
Georgian Republic to the Northwest; and on Turkey and
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the South. Azerbaijan's
oil reserves and strategic location near Turkey, a NATO
member, near an increasingly troubled Russia, and near
Iran, an avowed enemy of the United States, makes the
Caucasian nation of great geopolitical interest.
Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia have waged a nine-year
conflict over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly
Armenian enclave within Azeri territory. The Karabakh
Armenians have declared independence and occupied about
20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. Both sides have
generally complied with a Russian-mediated cease-fire
since May 1994 and are taking part in an OSCE-mediated
peace process, where prospects for a negotiated settlement
are only fair, given continued dispute over the enclave's
political status and the placement of peace-keepers.
Some one million people have been uprooted by the conflict
and live in displaced persons camps. In addition, due
to lack of employment opportunities and the region's
upheavals, an additional two million are estimated to
live and work outside of Azerbaijan, scattered mainly
throughout the former Soviet Union.
Currently Azerbaijan is drawing considerable world attention
as major oil companies flock to the region to explore
the Caspian and environs for oil and gas. The proposed
pipeline route to Ceyhan in Turkey has been promoted
by the American government as a hedge against other
projects perceived to be in the interests of Russia
or Iran. Yet despite proclaimed support from the Azerbaijani
and Turkish governments, the project is stalled. Most
oil company representatives declare it unprofitable
and, without more significant government financial backing,
unlikely to be built in the near-term. In the formula
of Caspian-watchers, either a billion barrels of oil
or a billion dollars in financing must be found.
Regardless of the time-table for pipeline projects,
Azerbaijan will continue to draw attention not only
for its oil reserves but for its political ferment,
its proximity to other strategically important nations,
and its chronic conflict with Armenia. The international
human rights community must place a greater, more in-depth
focus on Azerbaijan now, to prevent the kind of human
disasters witnessed in other oil-rich countries like
Nigeria.
B.
Civil Society and Human Rights
Azerbaijan has been slow to develop a human rights and
legal community. This is due in part to historical Soviet
interference in the development of civil society and
the effects of the 1990 Moscow-led invasion of Baku
to suppress the Popular Front movement. Since independence,
however, civil society development has been markedly
more restrained in Azerbaijan than in neighboring countries
such as Georgia or Armenia, where hundreds of NGOs have
sprung up in the 1990s. Azerbaijani activists cite three
difficulties in creating a strong NGO community: 1)
the authoritarian government places obstacles to registration
of non-profit, non-governmental groups; 2) without registration,
obtaining grants and local donations is difficult; 3)
the government's discouragement and the lack of funding
make it difficult for positive public opinion about
NGOs to develop.
But recently an energetic group of attorneys and civil
rights activists has become more prominent as the opposition
faces a pre- and post- election crackdown under the
authoritarian President Haidar Aliyev. Following the
troubled elections of October 1998, characterized as
fraudulent and unfair by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S. based National Democratic
Institute, and other independent observers, the opposition
has consolidated, contested the results, and sought
a repeat election, and with firm grounds. In the majority
view of independent observers, President Aliyev did
not receive sufficient votes - 66.7 percent under the
Constitution - to avoid a run-off. In response, President
Aliyev, who officially gained 76 percent of the votes
(and unofficially, at least 52 percent), has unleashed
a tide of oppression against the independent media and
outspoken political figures, levying punitive fines
for "insult" of the president, causing leading
editors and journalists to declare a hunger strike.
One opposition writer was sentenced in 1988 to 18 months
in jail. Faced with frequent street rallies and pickets,
the regime has forced through parliament a law punishing
unsanctioned demonstrations with up to three years in
prison. The cases of some 40 persons detained in September
1998 for unlawful assembly were making their way through
the court system through 1999. Reports of beatings and
other attacks abound. In September 1999, a journalist
was handed a one-year suspended sentence for calling
the president's brother a "kind of the oil industry."
In August 1999, Human Rights Watch issued a significant
report on Azerbaijan, "Impunity for Torture,"
documenting rampant physical abuse and torture.
Just at a time when criminal defense lawyers are more
needed than ever, they are grappling with their own
difficulties. They face intense pressure from the state
not to interfere with the prosecution of dissident activists,
and run the risk of landing in jail alongside their
politically unpopular clients. At least one prominent
independent lawyer has been arbitrarily expelled from
the Collegium of Advocates, the organization that controls
the defense bar. He and some one hundred other independent
licensed attorneys have been barred from pursuing criminal
defense practice. Since charges used to silence dissenters
are usually criminal rather than civil charges, this
bar against criminal practice by independent lawyers
forces dissenters to rely on the state-controlled Collegium
lawyers for their defense against the state's politically-motivated
charges.
C.
The Criminal Justice System
The current code of criminal procedures, virtually unreformed
since the Soviet era, essentially functions to maintain
the supremacy of the prosecutor and his criminal investigators.
The slogan coined by Stalin's Prosecutor General Vyshinsky,
"The confession is the crown of the evidence,"
remains in effect today. Detained or accused persons
have little access to lawyers. During the period known
in Russian as doznaniye, literally "finding out,"
when police are obtaining identification and the facts
of the case, suspects are often beaten and forced to
make incriminating confessions without the benefit of
contact with their attorneys.
Once in detention, lawyers may visit their clients,
but if they publicize mistreatment or torture, or attempt
to perform their own investigations of the facts of
the case, or publicize their concerns about wrongful
arrest with the press, they run the risk themselves
of being accused of violations of the 1980 Regulations
on the Legal Profession (Advokatura), or worse, of the
criminal code, which makes an overbroad notion of "divulging
the secrecy of the investigation" a punishable
offense.
The League has found that it is not uncommon that court
proceedings, particularly appeals to the Supreme Court,
are held without the defendant present, and with late
notification to the attorney. Attorneys are often helpless
to prevent the state from putting their clients on television,
publicizing their coerced confessions, or failing to
segregate witnesses during court, or other gross violations
even of the severely flawed Azerbaijani code of criminal
procedures.
The League has encountered difficulties in documenting
specific instances of abuse because some attorneys are
reluctant to go on the record, or even to talk to foreigners
for fear of retaliation.
III.
International Standards for the Protection of Lawyers
Standards for the treatment of lawyers were codified
relatively recently, beginning in 1990 , with the UN's
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. In 1994, the
mandate for the UN's Special Rapporteur on Independence
of the Judiciary was agreed upon. There are also non-binding
standards, notably the International Commission for
Justice's "Draft Principles on the Independence
of the Legal Profession" (the Noto Principles).
The following comprise the body of international protections
for lawyers:
-
1990 UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
- 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- 1985 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary
- The UN 1990 Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.
- The ICJ Noto Principles
- Preamble to the UN Charter, which declares the determination
"to establish conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained".
- UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/32 of
5 March 1993, entitled "The administration of justice
and human rights"
- The UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/41of
5 March 1993, entitled "Human rights in the administration
of justice"
The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, promulgated
in 1990, is the most comprehensive standardized document
to date outlining the rights and professional responsibilities
of lawyers. In particular, it enshrines guarantees for
the functioning of lawyers, reiterates lawyers' rights
to freedom of expression and association, and provides
for minimum protection for lawyers facing disciplinary
proceedings. The relevant protections follow:
16.
Governments shall ensure that lawyers (a) are able to
perform all of their professional functions without
intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference;
(b) are able to travel and to consult with their clients
freely both within their own country and abroad; and
(c) shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution
or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any
action taken in accordance with recognized professional
duties, standards and ethics.
17.
Where the security of lawyers is threatened as a result
of discharging their functions, they shall be adequately
safeguarded by the authorities.
18.
Lawyers shall not be identified with their clients or
their clients' causes as a result of discharging their
functions.
19.
No court or administrative authority before whom the
right to counsel is recognized shall refuse to recognize
the right of a lawyer to appear before it for his or
her client unless that lawyer as been disqualified in
accordance with national law and practice and in conformity
with these principles.
20.
Lawyers shall enjoy civil and penal immunity for relevant
statements made in good faith in written or oral pleadings
or in their professional appearances before a court,
tribunal or other legal or administrative authority.
21.
It is the duty of the competent authorities to ensure
lawyers access to appropriate information, files and
documents in their possession or control in sufficient
time to enable lawyers to provide effective legal assistance
to their clients. Such access should be provided at
the earliest appropriate time.
22.
Governments shall recognize and respect that all communications
and consultations between lawyers and their clients
within their professional relationship are confidential.
23.
Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom
of expression, belief, association and assembly. In
particular, they shall have the right to take part in
public discussion of matters concerning the law, the
administration of justice and the promotion and protection
of human rights and to join or form local, national
or international organizations and attend their meetings,
without suffering professional restrictions by reason
of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful
organization. In exercising these rights, lawyers shall
always conduct themselves in accordance with the law
and the recognized standards and ethics of the legal
profession.
24.
Lawyers shall be entitled to form and join self-governing
professional associations to represent their interests,
promote their continuing education and training and
protect their professional integrity. The executive
body of the professional associations shall be elected
by its members and shall exercise its functions without
external interference.
25.
Professional associations of lawyers shall co-operate
with Governments to ensure that everyone has effective
and equal access to legal services and that lawyers
are able, without improper interference, to counsel
and assist their clients in accordance with the law
and recognized professional standards and ethics.
26.
Codes of professional conduct for lawyers shall be established
by the legal professional through its appropriate organs,
or by legislation, in accordance with national law and
custom and recognized international standards and norms.
27.
Charges or complaints made against lawyers in their
professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously
and fairly under appropriate procedures. Lawyers shall
have the right to a fair hearing, including the right
to be assisted by a lawyer of their choice.
28.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers shall be brought
before an impartial disciplinary committee established
by the legal profession, before an independent statutory
authority, or before a court, and shall be subject to
an independent judicial review.
29.
All disciplinary proceedings shall be determined in
accordance with the code of professional conduct and
other recognized standards and ethics of the legal profession
and in the light of these principles.
International
human rights law focuses overwhelmingly on the rights
of everyone, including the rights of defendants and
others before the law. Thus, in the words of the UN's
Special Rapporteur, the effective functioning of lawyers
may be inferred to be necessary to these rights, rather
than as rights themselves, which is actually stronger:
The Special Rapporteur [on Independence of Judiciary]observes
in this relation that the overall conception of "justice"
embodied in the Charter and the work of the United Nations
incorporates respect for human rights and is conditioned
on judicial independence and impartiality as such and
for the safeguard of other human rights.
The
following articles also apply: Articles 7, 8, 10 and
11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
provide as follows: (Article 7) "All are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation
of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination." Article 8: "Everyone has
the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law." Article
10: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
and of any criminal charge against him." Article
11: "1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which he has had
all the guarantees necessary for his defense. 2. No
one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account
of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal
offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time
the penal offence was committed."
The
Special Rapporteur observes that whereas the requirements
of independent and impartial justice are explicit in
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration, they are clearly
implied in articles 7, 8 and 11 As noted, "the
requirements of independent and impartial justice are
explicit in article 14 quoted above, they are clearly
implied in articles 2 and 26."
The
full title of the Rapporteur is: UN Special Rapporteur
on the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary,
Jurors and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers
(and currently Param Cumaraswamy of Malaysia is appointed
to serve in this mandate. The mandate created by resolution
1994/41 of 4 March 1994. "The Commission on Human
Rights, noting both the increasing frequency of attacks
on judges, lawyers and court officials and the link
which existed between the weakening of safeguards for
the judiciary and lawyers and the gravity and frequency
of violations of human rights, requested the Chairman
of the Commission to appoint, for a period of three
years, a special rapporteur whose mandate would consist
of the following tasks: (a) to inquire into any substantial
allegations transmitted to him and to report his conclusions
thereon; (b) to identify and record not only attacks
on the independence of the judiciary, lawyers and court
officials, but also progress achieved in protecting
and enhancing their independence, and make concrete
recommendations including the provision of advisory
services or technical assistance when they were requested
by the State concerned; and (c) to study, for the purpose
of making proposals, important and topical questions
of principle with a view to protecting and enhancing
the independence of the judiciary and lawyers."
"The
Special Rapporteur observes that the requirements of
independent and impartial justice are universal and
are rooted in both natural and positive law. At the
international level, the sources of this law are to
be found in conventional undertakings, customary obligations
and general principles of law." (See also Article
38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.)
IV.
State Efforts to Control Defense Attorneys
A. Collegium Control of the Defense Bar
Like all former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan has traditionally
had three types of professionals providing legal services:
1) attorneys or barristers, known as "advocates"
(advokaty), who can represent clients in criminal court
and who are members of the Collegium of Advocates (roughly
equivalent to a bar association); 2) jurists (yuristy)
or solicitors, known as lawyers, are persons with legal
training who can represent clients in civil proceedings
only and can provide the legal advice needed in a highly
bureaucratic society; and 3) notaries (notariusy), who,
unlike their American counterparts, not only authenticate
signatures but prepare contracts in family and real
estate law. (Under a recent decree, jurists who pass
a number of requirements may obtain a license to practice
which includes the right to defend clients in criminal
cases under certain circumstances.) Advocates often
serve as "in-house" lawyers for state enterprises
and private firms.
A fourth type of legal practitioner, who does not necessarily
have any legal training, is the public defender, or
obshchestvenny zashchitnik, who makes statements on
behalf of a client (roughly equivalent to an amicus
brief). A public defender can attend a court proceeding
on behalf of an NGO. He or she cannot represent defendants
during pre-trial investigation.
Until 1998, advocates practiced law exclusively through
the Collegium of Advocates, the Soviet-style bar association
that has secured the state's monopoly on the profession
since 1922. Prosecutors, investigators, judges, and
law clerks may also be members of the Collegium, and
this mixing of professions has been a factor in the
organization's conservatism on legal reform and silence
about abuses within the criminal justice system. The
Collegium's monopoly on criminal defense practice serves
the state by creating a mechanism to control lawyers,
who often play an important role in political dissent
themselves and also can complicate efforts to silence
and jail other dissidents through criminal charges.
The monopoly is important to the Collegium's leadership,
since it wins a substantial financial gain by collecting
a large percentage of all fees paid to advocates. Not
only would independent practitioners not pay this percentage
to the Collegium, many of the best lawyers would be
tempted to work independently, and they would draw clients
away from the Collegium.
Officially, the Collegium is independent of the Ministry
of Justice and any other state control. In reality,
it, like most semi-public institutions in Azerbaijan,
is governed by the state's political influence. Although
the Ministry of Justice does not micromanage the day-to-day
operations, the Collegium leadership knows what is politically
acceptable to the Presidential Administration and the
Ministry of Justice. The leadership toes the line and
ensures that the lawyers it controls stay in line as
well. When it does not, a phone call from above can
quickly energize the Collegium leadership into action.
In addition to the pervasive fear in Azerbaijani society
of causing dangerous political offense, advocates working
within the Collegium are influenced by the organization's
direct control over their work and pay. The Collegium
controls the flow of case work from the criminal justice
system and requires lawyers to turn their fees over
to the Collegium's accounting offices. This is among
the features of a Soviet-style Collegium that make it
different than a Western-style professional society;
it functions as a kind of law firm itself. An advocate's
clients and salary are supplied by the Collegium, which
in turn takes between 15% and 25% of the advocate's
salary. Local lawyers have stated that they turn over
as much as 58 percent of their fees to the Collegium:
about 38 percent goes to taxes, and 20 percent for the
Collegium's "upkeep." A significant amount
of this upkeep money appears to go to perks for the
presidium; observers claim the Collegium deputy chair
drives a Mercedes, while advocates lack basic essentials
such as paper to print their briefs.
Lawyers in Azerbaijan report that the Collegium presidium
rarely interferes directly in an individual advocate's
work, but that typically a lawyer's Collegium supervisor
monitors the lawyers under him or her and exerts pressure
through slightly more subtle means such as suddenly
not finding cases to assign a lawyer who shows too much
independence. Since an advocate's work is officially
channeled through the Collegium (even if clients approach
a specific advocate, as they often do), an advocate
can be precluded from earning a living inside the Collegium
and thus force to seek one outside. Under recent regulations,
advocates may sign a contract with a private client
to handle civil cases, but the Collegium becomes suspicious
if an attorney is not available for its case assignments,
some of which are pro bono for indigent clients. Thus,
the best, most independent attorneys are forced to juggle
an unwieldy load of cases they have taken to keep the
Collegium off their backs; pro bono or low-paid cases
of political activists in trouble with whom they sympathize;
and other paying clients with civil or criminal cases
who may wind up getting them in trouble with the law
through their fees.
In many former Soviet states, control of advocates'
activity is facilitated by rules of conduct prohibiting
an advocate from visiting a client at home, or receiving
a client at home, ostensibly to prevent bribe-taking
or payments under the table, but in fact to ensure that
attorneys always operate under the watchful eye of the
state in the Collegium's offices.
Advocates have very little power, either in the broad
political scheme or within the justice system itself,
and they are vulnerable to the influence of the prosecutor's
office and the police in addition to the higher political
authorities. Faced with the enormous power of the state's
prosecution machinery and absolutely pervasive judicial
corruption, often the best a lawyer can do is to resort
to technicalities or health grounds to seek a sentence
reduction or a client's release. For this reason, the
general public frequently describes advocates as "musicians
at a funeral"- you need them for the ceremony,
but they can no longer really do anything for you.
Currently, the Collegium of Azerbaijan has approximately
500 members, of which an estimated 20 are believed to
be attorneys independent enough to choose to defend
politically-sensitive clients. Given the country's eight
million person population and the hundreds of citizens
that have been caught in the net of state repression
(journalists, human rights activists, political party
leaders, rebellious policemen), there is a severe shortage
of attorneys who can provide victims of human rights
abuse, let alone the population at large, a serious
legal defense.
In
addition, the Collegium's monopoly on defending criminal
cases deprives defendants of the opportunity to file
suits or defend themselves independently, in clear violation
of basic human rights and international standards for
the legal profession, such as the UN Basic Principles
for the Role of Lawyers. Moreover, attempts to practice
as a non-member have been all but unthinkable: Article
158 of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan punishes performing
services without a license by up to five years of imprisonment.
It is not know if this article has ever been invoked,
but lawyers are intimidated by believing it could apply
to them.
B. Attacks and Intimidation Directed at Independent
Lawyers
Azerbaijan has little experience in traditions such
as the independence of the bar, attorney-client privilege
shielding information from state inquiry, and an adversarial
system of justice in which every defendant should receive
a vigorous defense. Lawyers are often identified with
their clients, in the eyes of both the government and
the general public, and they assume a variety of risks
if they defend political opposition figures, independent
journalists, religious activists, or ethnic minorities.
Lawyers risk professional damage and even physical harm
when accepting politically-active clients charged with
crimes that appear to be fabricated. Some report suffering
a loss of private clients, or even cases assigned by
the Collegium, since clients are reluctant to be associated
with a lawyer who may get himself in trouble with the
government and be unable to defend them effectively.
Lawyers are reportedly subjected to threats of harm
or death, and several were jailed, apparently on fabricated
charges. Attorneys who defended either figures from
the previous government now out of power, or members
of newer opposition groups suffering reprisal for their
activism, face great difficulties in gaining access
to their clients.
Civil rights attorneys have told the League that they
frequently experience anonymous threatening phone calls,
tailing by plainclothesmen, unauthorized surveillance
and searches of their offices and homes. Frequently,
threats of physical harm or criminal prosecution are
made to them by persons known to be close to the police,
prosecutor, or security service, still known as the
KGB.
The worsening climate coincides with attempts by a number
of independent lawyers to push the bounds of the possible
for their profession. As they have pushed for greater
independence, the government, in particular the Ministry
of Justice, has fought back.
C.
Clampdown on Independent Criminal Lawyers
On October 4, 1997, President Haidar Aliyev began a
process that threatened to break the Collegium's monopoly.
On that date, he issued Presidential Decree No. 637
"On Confirming the List of Activities which Require
Special Permission (Licenses)." This decree listed
all the types of fee-paid services for which licenses
would be required, and among the activities was provision
of paid legal services. Seven months later, on May 1,
1998, the Cabinet of Ministers issued regulations implementing
the presidential decree, Resolution No. 103, "On
Confirming the Rules for Special Permission for Paid
Legal Services (Licenses)."
Thus, an independent, private, fee-paid bar was legalized
in Azerbaijan through government reform measures in
1997 and 1998.
The process of applying for and receiving a license
was relatively routine, and most local lawyers saw the
new requirements as simply one of a series of measures
to formalize state licensing power in various areas
and to provide the state revenue through fees collected.
To receive a license, an individual must present a passport,
a legal education diploma, proof of registration with
the tax inspector, a work log (known in Russian as trudovaya
knizhka, literally work booklet, an official document
in which all citizens are required to have their current
and past employment officially recorded) demonstrating
two years of legal internship work (stazhirovka), and
100 million manat (approximately $350). Three individuals
who hold licenses can apply for a firm license for the
same price. As of June 1999, the Ministry of Justice
records indicated that 122 individuals and 13 firms
had received licenses, and only two applications had
been rejected because the applicants did not have a
higher legal education.
When the October 1997 decree was first issued, there
was uncertainty in the legal community about who was
required to obtain a license and about what rights a
license conferred. The decree requires licenses for
those who engage in "paid legal services,"
or platnye yuridicheskiye uslugi. That Russian phrase
(Russian is still used in Azerbaijan) could mean legal
services in the most general sense, including those
rendered by advocates, or it could mean only those services
rendered by jurists, the specific type of lawyer limited
to civil practice. The October decree did not specifically
include advocates (advokaty), but the May 1998 implementing
regulations did mention in the fine print "procedures
for all types of advocates' (advokatskiye) services,"
including civil appeals, court appearances, and so on.
Azeri lawyers and even government officials have told
the League that the most common assumption when the
decree was passed was that all lawyers were required
to obtain a license.
The decree raised two problems for the Ministry of Justice
and the Collegium. First, Collegium members did not
want to suffer the expense of obtaining a license. The
amount of $350 is many months of a typical lawyer's
salary. Second, the decree could be interpreted as superceding
the old Soviet Law on Advocates from 1980, which the
Collegium claims is still the governing law related
to advocates and is the basis of their virtual monopoly
of criminal defense work. If any lawyer could simply
obtain a license and then engage in private criminal
practice outside the Collegium, it would lose fees and
clients and likely gradually disintegrate.
Two
months after the regulations were issued, Minister of
Justice Sudaba Hasanova took action in an attempt to
contain the possible repercussions of the decree. Her
press service published an announcement asserting that
the presidential decree and licensing requirements did
not apply to advocates in the Collegium. Then, in December
1998, the Minister issued a letter barring lawyers who
hold a license but are not Collegium members from representing
clients in criminal cases.
The
immediate impact of the limitations imposed by the Minister
of Justice is somewhat limited because only a handful
of licensed lawyers immediately took the chance of setting
up a private criminal practice. Some of these lawyers
told the League that at times they are even able to
convince judges to admit them to court despite the Minister's
instruction, based on either personal reputation in
the court or arguments about the illegality of the Minister's
limitation on the presidentially-decreed licensing procedure.
Nevertheless, the restriction has significant immediate
and long-term consequences.
First,
the more lucrative part of any local law practice in
Azerbaijan is criminal work; arbitrarily banning independent
lawyers from engaging in such cases will effectively
limit the number of independent licensed lawyers. Unable
to gain numbers and affluence, the ability of independent
lawyers to form a strong force for reform and protection
of legal rights will be greatly curtailed. Even more
important, independent lawyers are stripped of their
ability to defend victims of human rights abuse, usually
cases performed pro bono, or for a low fee, and those
victims have less chance of securing a vigorous, effective
legal defense. Azerbaijan has a well-documented history
of silencing and punishing political dissent by falsifying
criminal charges. The Criminal Code allows for more
severe penalties than the Civil Code (namely, imprisonment
instead of fines) and also creates a greater stigma
for the defendant. Preventing independent lawyers from
defending dissidents charged with criminal offenses
will undermine the broader struggle for human rights
and criminal justice.
From a legal point of view, the Minister of Justice's
pronouncements are not binding; she does not have the
authority to amend a presidential decree. According
to Azeri law, presidential decrees and regulations issued
by the Cabinet of Ministers are higher legal authority
than a ministerial instruction or regulation. Collegium
officials counter this by arguing that the ministerial
declarations simply clarify the true intent of the decree
and regulations. This argument is dismissed, however,
by local lawyers and members of the parliamentary staff
and presidential administration, who have told the League
that the Minister's actions clearly placed new, unintended
limitations on the reach of the decree. When pressed
about the apparent illegality of the Minister's action,
officials in the Justice Ministry and other government
agencies sigh and shrug and note that the issue will
only be clarified when a new Law on Advocates is finally
drafted.
By December 1998, when the Minister banned licensed
lawyers from criminal courts, more than eighty lawyers
had applied for and received licenses. Among them were
some members of the Collegium, who sought licenses in
order to gain the freedom to set their own fees and
choose their own clients. Soon after the Minister's
action, seventy of the lawyers affected submitted a
joint letter of complaint to the Cabinet of Ministers
in an effort to secure the repeal of the Minister of
Justice's order. The Cabinet of Ministers referred the
complaint to the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan for a private
advisory opinion, which was rendered in mid-April. One
lawyer who has read the Supreme Court's decision, but
was unable to obtain an official copy of it, reports
that the Court supported the petitioning lawyers. However,
neither the Court nor the Cabinet of Ministers has made
the decision public as an official ruling. Instead,
the case was referred to a lower court for consideration,
the Nasuminsky Regional Court, and the outcome is not
yet known.
As with other Soviet-style regulatory legislation, the
laws affecting the bar and non-profit law associations
appear to be passed in order to make people ask the
government for permission (e.g. they are known in Russian
as razreshitel'ny, or discretionary) rather than encouraging
them to legalize their activity (registratsionyy, or
registrational). The net effect is that 1) anyone who
is decent and generally law-abiding is still bound to
be breaking some law, some time; 2) the government can
always get a case together against anyone; 3) what should
be legal activity is unnecessarily criminalized through
overregulation, thus ensuring that criminals are the
ones who control the economy.
D.
The Case of Aslan Ismailov
The
Collegium, with the apparent collusion of the Ministry
of Justice, has conducted targeted harassment of one
particular lawyer in apparent retaliation for his criticism
of the Collegium and the Ministry of Justice and for
his advocacy of a strong independent defense bar. Aslan
Ismailov, formerly a judge in the Stavropol Territory
during the Soviet era, and a prominent attorney and
legal advisor to past governments, was a member of the
Collegium until his dismissal in 1999. He received a
license to provide paid legal services on June 12, 1998.
He has served repeatedly, pro bono or for a nominal
fee, as legal counsel in human rights cases that have
met with government resistance, particularly cases involving
freedom of the media. (Press freedom is an extremely
sensitive and volatile issue in Azerbaijan where, according
to Reporters Sans Frontieres annual report, 10 newspapers
were subjected to total or partial censorship in 60
separate incidents and at least 24 journalists were
arrested in Azerbaijan in 1998 and 40 beaten by police.)
From
February 21 to March 5, 1999, Aslan Ismailov and two
other Azerbaijani lawyers - one a member of the Collegium,
the other a licensed attorney - traveled to the United
States on a training and advocacy trip sponsored by
the International League for Human Rights. During their
stay, they met with judges, lawyers, journalists, scholars,
congressional staffers, and government officials. Their
trip coincidentally overlapped with a working visit
by the Minister of Justice and the president's legal
advisor, who were meeting with many of the same policy-makers
as the lawyers. Their simultaneous presentation of information
that directly contradicted what the Minister was saying
was undoubtedly a cause of irritation to the Minister.
Within days of his return, on March 18, Mr. Ismailov
was informed that he had been expelled from the Collegium.
The Ministry was reportedly poised to withdraw his private
license as well, but due to a last-minute intervention
by the U.S. with the Minister of Justice, Ms. Hasanova
promised not to take this additional action.
The case of Aslan Ismailov provides an important window
into the system of Collegium control and coercion over
attorneys.
The official reason for Aslan Ismailov's expulsion from
the Collegium of Lawyers is a "serious violation"
of Article 10 of the "Regulations of the Advokatura
of the Azerbaijan Republic." In his response of
April 20, 1999, to a formal inquiry from the International
League for Human Rights, the chairman of the presidium
(board) of the Collegium, Azer Tagiev, states that the
offending act was engaging in "commercial activities"
since June 1998 as the founder of the Viza Law Firm
and "hiding all of his income" from the Collegium
by failing to inform them of his commercial activities.
For
several reasons, these allegations are false and the
expulsion unjustified. First, Article 10 does not prohibit
engaging in commercial activity. Rather, it stipulates
that "Members of the Collegium of Lawyers may not
work in (sostiat' na sluzhbe v) state or social organizations.
Exceptions may be made by the Presidium of the Collegium
of Lawyers for individuals involved in scholarly or
pedagogical work." Since a private law firm is
neither a state nor a social organization, the activity
cited as warranting his expulsion in no way violates
Article 10.
Second,
Mr. Tagiev claims that "A. Ismailov categorically
refused to provide any explanation" to the Collegium
for his engaging in commercial activities. Notification
to the Collegium is required neither by Azerbaijani
law nor by any internal professional code of conduct.
(The Collegium of Lawyers of Azerbaijan has no such
code of conduct.) Moreover, Mr. Ismailov claims convincingly
that he did in fact notify the Collegium of his opening
an independent law firm. He asserts that the Collegium
had to have been aware because it supplied him with
some of the paperwork he needed to secure his license
from the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, he claims, the
Collegium had in fact entered into contractual obligations
with his law firm, making the contention that they were
unaware of his independent practice absurd. Mr. Ismailov
has provided the International League for Human Rights
with a copy of this contract, which predates his expulsion.
The
official basis for Mr. Ismailov's expulsion is untenable
for yet another reason: Mr. Ismailov opened his private
law firm in full accordance with Azerbaijani law. Mr.
Tagiev confirms in his letter to the League that Mr.
Ismailov had duly obtained the necessary license from
the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, neither the Collegium
nor the Office of the Procurator General has initiated
charges against Mr. Ismailov for any alleged violations
of its code of conduct or the law, including this one
- something they would reasonably have done if the allegation
of illegal conduct was in fact true.
Despite
his patently unjust expulsion and resulting limitations
on his ability to practice law, an appeals court recently
ruled in favor of the Collegium, suggesting either gross
incompetence or that court's susceptibility to political
pressure to limit Mr. Ismailov's ability to practice
law in Azerbaijan. (Regarding political pressure, we
note, for example, that the chair of the Collegium,
Mr. Tagiev, is also a member of the official Central
Electoral Commission, a body which both helped to ensure
the re-election of President Aliyev, and also remained
impervious to proposals by Western governments for more
transparency and accountability.)
In
order to restore his right to practice his profession
as a criminal trial attorney, Ismailov brought suit
against the Collegium in a district court alleging that
his expulsion was illegal. In documents submitted to
the court, the Collegium asserted two reasons for Ismailov's
expulsion: (1) he failed to obtain permission from the
Collegium for his trip to the U.S. and to provide a
formal explanation for his trip after he returned, and
(2) his work as a privately licensed lawyer constitutes
entrepreneurial activity (predprinimatelskaya deyatelnos't),
which the Collegium argued is forbidden for its members
under the 1980 Law on Advocates. In addition to these
two official reasons submitted to the Court, in oral
arguments witnessed by a League representative, the
Collegium referred to additional justifications such
as Ismailov's criticism of the Collegium's politically-motivated
monopoly on the bar; his attempts to promote himself
in the local media; alleged breaches of his responsibilities
as an advocate; and his efforts to politicize his case,
citing his references to his meeting with opposition
leader Rasul Guliev in the U.S. and his attempts to
have observers from international organizations and
the U.S. Embassy in the courtroom.
In
other fora, the Collegium has given varying reasons
for Ismailov's expulsion. In meetings with U.S. Embassy
officials and correspondence with the League, the Collegium
denied that Ismailov's expulsion was in any way related
to his trip to the U.S. Instead, the Collegium attributed
his expulsion only to charges that Ismailov had obtained
his private license illegally, and that he was engaged
in illegal economic activity (a reference to the private
practice of law, not other business). The latter was
technically the same charge made in court, but the Collegium
implied to foreigners that Ismailov was hiding income
or engaged in activity illegal in itself. In court,
the Collegium denied it had made such charges and argued
only that Ismailov's activity was technically illegal
because a Collegium member cannot be engaged in private
legal practice, in their interpretation of the law.
Immediately following Ismailov's expulsion, the deputy
head of the Collegium said in a taped interview for
a local newspaper that the expulsion was based on Ismailov's
conduct during his trip to the U.S.
Under
scrutiny, the Collegium's charges are legally untenable.
There is no clear requirement that Collegium members
receive permission to travel abroad, or debrief after
their trips, and no other cases of the Collegium objecting
to travel by one of its members could be found. Many
Collegium members travel without ever asking or receiving
permission. Ismailov himself had travelled abroad to
Strasbourg to take part in meetings at the Council of
Europe four times in the previous year and the Collegium
raised no objections.
The
second asserted grounds for expulsion has broad implications
for the ability of lawyers to practice independent of
the Collegium. The Collegium alleges that the 1980 Law
on Advocates prohibits advocates from engaging in any
economic activity other than teaching or research, and
that the private practice of Collegium members constitutes
illegal "economic activity," which is specifically
prohibited in the 1980 law. In oral arguments in Court,
Collegium officials took the position that even simply
holding a license to practice privately would constitute
a violation of the restriction on advocates' economic
activity and be grounds for expulsion.
Several
factual and legal points raised by Ismailov at trial
illustrate that the Collegium's position is legally
untenable. The old Soviet Law on Advocates has been
superseded by the new constitution and other legal acts
of the independent state of Azerbaijan. According to
Azerbaijani law, specifically Article 50 of the "Law
on Normative Acts," if a new law contradicts the
norms of an old law, "the norms of the new law
are applied." Article 59 of the 1995 Constitution
of Azerbaijan states categorically that "Everyone
may engage in commercial activity." Thus, the blanket
right to engage in commercial activity enshrined in
the 1995 Constitution supercedes the 1980 law. Second,
Article 3, point 2, of the 1993 "Law on Entrepreneurial
Activity" enumerates the limited number of occupations
that may not legally engage in commercial activity.
All of them are positions in the government involved
in taxes and finance, and none applies to Aslan Ismailov,
who holds no government job whatsoever. Finally, Ismailov
made a convincing case that the presidential decree
on licenses extends to advocates and has greater legal
authority than a Soviet law passed twenty years ago
that is understood to be outdated.
Thus,
the issue at stake is not that the government wishes
to regulate attorneys who might charge high fees and
make it difficult for the poor and victims or human
rights abuse to obtain counsel. Rather, the government's
objective is to regulate - indeed overregulate - any
type of private criminal defense, even defense that
is pro bono, or for a nominal fee, unless subjected
to political control.
Even
if private practice as such were prohibited to Collegium
members, Ismailov would technically not be in violation
of the law. He does not hold an official position at
the Viza law firm where he works, but actually works
there under a contract the firm concluded with the Collegium
in which the firm pays for Ismailov's services. The
firm had in fact paid the Collegium according to the
contract each month from October 1996 until May 1998.
When Ismailov produced the contract in court, the Collegium
initially argued that it was invalid because the supervisor,
not the presidium, had approved it. The last day of
trial, the Collegium changed its position and argued
that the agreement might be valid but that it only empowered
Ismailov to provide legal services to Viza itself, not
to the firm's clients.
The
inconsistent, changing, and legally unfounded charges
make it clear that Ismailov's expulsion was a selective
retaliatory act by the Ministry of Justice and the Collegium.
When questioned about the timing of Ismailov's expulsion,
on the heels of his return from the U.S., Collegium
officials asserted that they had only recently become
aware of his illegal private practice. This is highly
improbably given the high profile often accorded Ismailov's
cases in the media. In addition, almost a year prior
to the decision to expel him, Ismailov's Collegium supervisor
himself had not only seen, but notarized the paperwork
that Ismailov submitted as part of his application for
a law license. When pressed about why other Collegium
members who hold private licenses were not being expelled,
at least one of whom was pointed out in the courtroom,
the Collegium deputy chair asserted they were unaware
of any other members who held licenses and promised
that appropriate action would be taken against them
as well.
Despite
the clear weight of the legal arguments, the district
court ruled against Ismailov.
He appealed the decision in higher courts, and by September,
his appeal to the Supreme Court had been rejected, and
he had exhausted all existing local remedies for his
right to practice his profession.
The
international human rights community has three interests
at stake in this particular case. First, Ismailov is
presenting the legal case for an independent bar, which
must be a central element in legal reform for any country.
Second, he is one of the most high-profile individuals
raising important issues like corruption, media censorship,
and other human rights violations, and not only in public,
but in the courts. If he is silenced, it will send a
strong signal to others who might be discouraged from
raising legal challenges to human rights abuses and
injustice in the courts.) Third, he has challenged the
unreformed, Soviet-era Collegium of Advocates, similar
to the Collegia in most other post-Soviet states, and
his case is a litmus test for the degree to which the
rule of law, defended vigorously by lawyers, will be
tolerated by post-Soviet governments.
Although
there is not a mechanism as such for Ismailov to appeal
his individual case, the Constitutional Court could
play an important role in settling this point. Azerbaijani
law permits the Constitutional Court to rule on points
of law on its own initiative, without waiting for a
referral. The Court could thus affirm what the law already
says implicitly: that the 1997 Presidential Decree "On
Confirming the List of Activities which Require Special
Permission (Licenses)" applies to all legal personalities,
including members of the Collegium. Such an unequivocal
ruling would make it easier for Mr. Ismailov to successfully
sue to be reinstated into the Collegium and for other
lawyers to defend themselves against similar discriminatory
charges.
V.
Issues on the Horizon
A. New Draft Law on Advocates
The government is rumored to be preparing a draft Law
on Advocates to replace the 1980 law. Periodically in
the last two years, representatives of the Azerbaijani
government, including the legal advisors in the president's
administration, have said that such a law is being drafted,
that it has allegedly "already been approved"
by the Council of Europe, or that it is "just about"
to be passed in parliament.
A new law could make significant strides on a number
of important questions, including breaking the Collegium
monopoly on criminal law practice and creating a new
system for licensing lawyers. The Ministry of Justice
and the Collegium will likely lobby to retain as many
controls over the bar as possible, so local lawyers
and the international community should work to counter
this influence by urging transparency in the adoption
process and conformity with international standards.
As of August 1999, many local lawyers and government
officials claimed that some draft law existed, but few
had actually seen it and none was able or willing to
produce a copy. Despite requests by some leading attorneys,
the League, and the Baku office of the American Bar
Association's CEELI program (Central and East European
Law Initiative), among others, the government has not
released the text of a draft law. One lawyer who is
a member of parliament claimed he had also not been
able to obtain it, although he could reasonably expect
to see it as a lawyer and as member of a legislative
drafting committee. Several sources reported that the
existing draft was actually written two years ago, perhaps
by the Collegium, and predicted it will be substantially
if not wholly revised before it is circulated widely
for discussion. The League has obtained a version of
the draft Law on Advocates circulated nearly two years
ago, but according to informants, the latest draft has
been changed substantially.
Government
and Collegium officials who spoke with the League uniformly
pointed to Azerbaijan's desire to join the Council of
Europe as a major force driving legal reform efforts
and, specifically, the drafting of the new Law on Advocates.
Every official interviewed by the League noted with
satisfaction that a draft law on advocates had been
submitted and "approved" by the Council of
Europe. Unfortunately, no one could specify exactly
what draft had been "approved." The League
has determined that the COE does not divulge information
about its review process or its specific comments on
drafts submitted, although some representatives noted
privately that the COE makes recommendations to governments,
that comments on part of a version of the law had been
supplied, but in any event, the COE does not provide
a "stamp of approval" on a given country's
draft law. Meanwhile, the draft law is now obsolete,
and it is not certain to what degree current drafts
have taken into consideration any recommendations they
have received from COE experts. Regrettably, because
the review and commentary process has been initiated,
Government officials including the Minister of Justice
can claim that a draft meeting international standards
exists and there is no need for further review by international
experts.
Still, legal experts in parliament and the presidential
administration appeared open to working with international
experts on a new draft law and estimated that serious
work on a draft would begin in the summer or fall of
1999, with passage in the fall or spring of 2000. The
government had promised to present the World Bank with
a draft Law on Advocates by July 1999, as part of negotiations
over the Action Plan on legal reform required to obtain
a major new Structural Adjustment Credit.
B.
The Association of Lawyers of Azerbaijan
As a response to increased government restrictions on
lawyers, the Association of Lawyers of Azerbaijan (ALA)
was founded on May 20, 1997. Although the non-profit,
non-governmental organization has applied three times
for registration, each time it has been refused by the
Ministry of Justice. At least once, the Ministry violated
the law by failing to accept or reject the ALA's application
within four months of submission. Efforts to contest
the Ministry's decision in a regional court in December
1997 failed. After changing their by-laws and submitting
to a number of other requests, the ALA re-applied with
a civil suit, and was once again rejected, despite the
lawyers' full compliance with the law. The judge at
People's Court told the ALA point-blank: "I can't
dispute the Ministry of Justice; I can't cut off my
own hands."
The ALA is still hoping to contest the latest rejection
again in court. They join many other human rights and
other civic organizations - some of them ALA's clients
- which have failed to gain permission to operate from
the authorities, who manipulate association laws to
keep a tight lid on anti-government protest. Although
unregistered itself, the ALA is attempting to help other
NGOs get registered, and holding public seminars and
publishing papers on registration law.
Despite its failure to register, the ALA has attracted
more than 40 members. With this support, the ALA has
set up a modest office and works to implement various
programs, including: 1) general legal education for
the public 2) legislative and court reform; 3) legal
aid to NGOs and independent press; 4) professional training
for attorneys and students; 5) outreach to other attorneys
at home and abroad. Although official membership is
small, the ALA also reaches other attorneys who at this
time are either fearful of joining the organization,
due to possible retaliation by the regime, or who are
reluctant to give up their time to struggling for the
very life of the organization itself.
The ALA has prepared pocket-sized pamphlets providing
legal advice for citizens detained by the police. It
has published several books, including the decisions
of the Supreme Court, speeches made by lawyers in court
(an important way of sharing trial strategies in a non-precedent
system), and articles analyzing current legislative
developments and the state of the bar. Members have
given lectures at local universities, and hold regular
meetings to discuss urgent legal issues. In June 1998,
the ALA and the U.S. National Democracy Institute (NDI)
jointly organized a seminar on the problems of registration
of NGOs in Azerbaijan; 30 unregistered NGOs attended.
It is crucial for the development of an independent
bar that grassroots initiatives like the ALA be supported,
in order to establish alternative associations of lawyers.
For example, such alternatives to the state-controlled
Collegium could eventually play a role in the licensing
procedure to balance the Collegium and Ministry of Justice's
influence.
VI.
Recommendations
1.
The League calls on the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan
and the Government of Azerbaijan to use their good offices
to restore the right of Aslan Ismailov and any other
attorneys
affected by the December 1998 instruction from the Minister
of Justice, to practice their profession as criminal
defense attorneys before the courts of Azerbaijan.
2.
The League recognizes the need for a professional accreditation
process for lawyers, and that different models can be
used for this purpose from democratic nations, including
reform models from within the CIS. (For example, in
the U.S., there are the differing "California model"
and "New York model.") Nevertheless, certain
basic principles of accreditation, consistent with the
UN's Rules for the bar, can be proposed, in addition
to recognizing the democratic principle of self-regulation
of professional bodies, free from government politically-motivated
obstruction.
We
urge that accreditation of lawyers to the bar for both
civil and criminal defense be a process that is clear,
transparent, fair, and subject to review. The bodies
or ministries that accredit lawyers must contain persons
of eminence, good reputation, and merit in the legal
community, and their deliberations should be subject
to law and to public accountability. The Collegium must
not maintain a monopoly over the bar associations, and
other associations, organizations, and societies for
the legal profession must be tolerated and legalized.
3.
The League calls on the Council of Europe to make a
public statement about its recommendations concerning
the draft Law on the Advocacy (bar) in Azerbaijan, in
order to prevent misrepresentation of its position on
the draft law, and to encourage further participation
in the legislative process in Azerbaijan by independent
attorneys.
4.
The League calls on the Council of Europe, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN's Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World
Bank, the U.S. Government, and all other institutions
with technical assistance programs operating in Azerbaijan
to ensure that lawyers independent from government control
may participate in and benefit from such programs. We
urge that these institutions take into account the facts
of the suppression of the independent bar in Azerbaijan
by the President's Administration and the Ministry of
Justice, and to work toward the inclusion of local attorneys,
particularly those engaged in civil rights defense,
in the process of legislative review, and the design
and implementation of training and education programs.
5.
The League calls on the Government of Azerbaijan to
accept immediately the application of the Association
of Lawyers of Azerbaijan (ALA), a non-governmental organization
that has complied with all local association regulations,
and to register the ALA as an NGO and permit it to operate
without obstruction as a professional society of jurists
and advocates.
Acknowledgements
This report was based on fact-finding missions to Azerbaijan
by League board and staff members in 1998 and 1999.
It was researched and written by Erika Dailey, Catherine
A. Fitzpatrick, and Katherine Mooney and edited by Catherine
A. Fitzpatrick.
The
International League for Human Rights
Since
its founding, the League has worked to keep human rights
at the forefront of international affairs and to give
meaning and effect to the human rights values enshrined
in international human rights treaties and conventions.
The League's special mission for more than half a century
has been defending individual human rights advocates
who have risked their lives to promote the ideals of
a just and civil society in their homelands. Based in
New York, with representation in Geneva and dozens of
affiliates and partners around the world, the League
is a non-governmental, non-profit organization now in
its 58th year. The League has special consultative status
at the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the
International Labor Organization, and also contributes
to the Africa Commission and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe. With the UN Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as its platform, the League raises human
rights issues and cases before the UN and other intergovernmental
regional organizations in partnership with our colleagues
abroad, helping to amplify their voices and provide
effective protection for their efforts.
The
League conducts regular seminars for policy-makers,
government officials, and NGOs on such pressing issues
as reform of the UN's human rights offices, improvement
of OSCE's field missions, and building human rights
standards into corporate audits and creating awareness
of the importance of transparency, democratic governance,
and an independent bar among investors in emerging markets.
In our public letter-writing campaigns for political
prisoners and persecuted lawyers and human rights activists;
in our meetings with top government officials, and in
our frequent U.S. and foreign press interviews, the
League strives to ensure that human rights remains at
the top of the agenda for international dialogue and
action.
Governing
Council: President: Scott Horton; Vice Presidents: Lung-chu
Chen, Felice D. Gaer, Alice Kandell, Rafael Pastor,
Lexie Brockway Potamkin; Secretary: Elisabeth Kalogris;
Treasurer: Christine Davies; Mimi Alperin, Ken Blackwell,
Andrew Blane, Elena Bonner, Giuseppe Bisconti, Andrew
Byrnes, Roger Clark, Alan Dlugash, Robert F. Drinan,
John P. Dunfey, Fang Li Zhi, Tom J. Farer, Linda Filardi,
Nadine B. Hack, Dorothy L. Hibbert, Edward Kline, Glenn
S. Kolleeny, Sidney Liskofsky, Theodor Meron, Anthony
Richter, Sidney Rosdeitcher, Barnett R. Rubin, Bertrand
Sellier, Dorothy Thau; International Experts Committee:
Jaime Castillo Velasco, Roberta Cohen, Samuel Dash,
Feliks Gross, Benjamin Hooks, Ellen Kuzwayo, C. William
Maynes, Thomas P. Melady, Soli J. Sorabjee, Helen Suzman,
Stefan Trechsel, William Vanden Heuvel, David Weissbrodt;
Honorary President: Jerome J. Shestack; Chaiman Emeritus:
Leo Nevas.
For
More Information:
Catherine
A. Fitzpatrick, Executive Director
International League for Human Rights
823 UN Plaza, Suite 717
New York, NY 10017
(212)-661-0480 www.ilhr.org
(212)-661-0416 (fax) cfitz@ilhr.org
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