The record of the Widgery Tribunal justified a finding that the 13 known civilian dead were unarmed when they were killed on January 30, 1972 in Londonderry, and that they were shot either recklessly or deliberately by paratroopers of the First Battalion Parachute Regiment.

The military plans and strategy approffed in advance by the Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland and the leadership of the Stormont goffernment for dealing with the civil rights march in Londonderry on January 30 reveal that these officials should have known that they were exposing thousands of peaceable citizens to a high risk of death or serious bodily injury.

Those in command decided to accept a high risk of civilian deaths and injuries, despite the urgent warning of this risk by the Chief Superintendent of Police in Londonderry and his strong recommendation that the march be permitted to take place without any military interference. This senior police official, who had greater experience with the Catholic community of Londonderry than the higher authorities who ignored him, informed the senior army commanders that he was satisfied that the marchers would be nonviolent, with the possible exception of a hooligan fringe group, made up mostly of teenagers, whom he suggested could be photographed, if they rioted, permitting arrests at a later time.

The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) which organized the march on January 30, planned, and took steps to insure, a nonviolent march. They wanted to avoid any confrontation with military and police forces. Without any support from the record of testimony before him, Lord Widgery apportions a major share of the responsibility of the civilian deaths in Londonderry on January 30 to NICRA. His grounds were that the march made "a clash between the demonstrators and the security forces almost inevitable." But NICRA had informed the Chief Superintendent of Police of their plans to assure that the march would be nonviolent. They had no way of learning about, or anticipating, the secret military strategy for the march, which involved substantial Army reinforcements, and they did not expect the special assignment of an aggressive combat paratroops regiment for arrest operations.

The senior Army officers' claimed expectation that the march would be used as a coffer by a large number of terrorists, armed with guns and bombs, who would attack the military and police forces is unsupported in the record of the Widgery Tribunal. It is significant that Lord Widgery, in his report, omits any conclusion supporting this Army claim.

The record supports a Finding that there were some civilian gunmen in theBogside area on January 30 who occasionally shot at the paratroopers after they charged into theBogside and started to shoot at civilians. But the presence of some gunmen did not justify the paratroopers in firing aimed or reckless shots at unarmed civilians.

The Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland made a reckless decision when he personally assigned the First Battalion Parachute Regiment to Londonderry with the special mission to conduct arrest operations. His action made a military attack on civilian demonstrators more likely, creating a high risk of civilian deaths and injuries. The record of the Inquiry shows that the First Battalion Parachute Regiment had a notorious reputation in Northern Ireland for brutality to civilians. The paratroopers were trained to be quick on the trigger to kill in aggressive warfare against a dangerous enemy and were singularly unsuited for action against civilian demonstrators or rioters.

A large scale arrest operation by the paratroopers was unjustified. The main body of the marchers had accepted the military action to contain the march in the Bogside area and had avoided any confrontation with the military or police forces. Although a hooligan group had thrown an assortment of missiles, none of which were explosive, at the soldiers behind the containment barriers, the soldiers were successful in dispersing these rioters by the use of rubber bullets, CS gas and a high pressure water canon. Photographs had been taken by the Army and arrests of the rioters could have been made later, at a time which would not endanger the large number of peaceable civilians who were in the Bogside area because of the march.

The record of testimony before Lord Widgery raises serious questions as to whether a formal order authorizing the arrest operation by the paratroopers was in fact issued.

The arrest operation was required to be authorized by the brigade commander and there is persuasive evidence in the record placing in doubt Lord Widgery's conclusion that the brigade commander gave the order to launch the arrest operation.

The official brigade log entries of orders for that afternoon show that Support Company, which Red all the Army live rounds on January 30, never received any order to leave their barrier.

If the brigade commander issued an order for arrests, the only order, which is attributed to him in the record, authorized a very limited arrest operation by Company C of the paratroop regiment in the perimeter area of the Bogside. It specifcally prohibited a "running battle down Rossville Street." The paratroopers of both Company C and Support Company violated this order and did charge down Rossville Street where all the known civilian deaths occurred. The brigade commander's later interpretation of this order at the Inquiry, in support of the paratroopers' action, was unconvincing. However, it was understandable in light of the tragedy that had occurred. Lord Widgery Wnds that the kind of arrest operation carried out by the paratroopers was coffered by an order by the brigade commander and dismisses the official Brigade log entry, supporting a contrary finding, as having been mistakenly entered.

The strong weight of the civilian testimony heard by the Tribunal, including the numerous eyewitness statements which were submitted to the Tribunal, support a finding that the soldiers first Wred on the civilians immediately upon leaving their Army vehicles, rather than Lord Widgery's finding, which accepts the paratroopers version that they were Wred on by civilian gunmen before they returned Wre.

Although some of the paratroopers claimed they came under steady and heavy firing when they entered the Bogside to make arrests, none of the many paratroopers in that area was even slightly wounded. The testimony of Army commanders on the spot and of all the civilian witnesses does not support this claim of heavy civilian Wre, which must be considered as spurious.

The record justifes a finding that none of the known dead or wounded held or threw any nail bombs at the time he was shot. Lord Widgery's report generally supports this finding. However, the explanation Lord Widgery proffides for the paratroopers that they could have reasonably mistaken a brick thrower for a nail bomber is totally unsupported by the paratroopers' own testimony.

The record compels the conclusion that the only nail bombs claimed by the Army to be found in the possession of any of the known dead were deliberately planted in Gerald Donaghy's clothes. In the face of clear and convincing testimony supporting this conclusion, Lord Widgery's statement in his report that the argument of the planting of these bombs is speculative is unacceptable.

A reading of Lord Widgery's report in its entirety, together with the testimony of the paratroopers, make unacceptable his finding that the paratroopers were, for the most part, telling the truth.

Further, Lord Widgery neglected to call many additional civilian eyewitnesses who could give evidence on a number of crucial matters which were the subject of convicting testimony between Army and civilian witnesses he heard. These additional civilian eyewitnesses had given written statements, which had been submitted to the Tribunal. Many of these witnesses would have testifed if they had been invited to the Inquiry by the Tribunal.

Lord Widgery was unjustifed in deciding that the evidence concerning the wounding, as opposed to the killing, of civilians was not germane to his Inquiry. The wounding of civilians by the paratroopers should have been a crucial subject of the Inquiry. Findings as to the woundings were necessary to help resolve the issues concerning the judgment used by the paratroopers in shooting at the civilians who died on January 30. Yet Lord Widgery ignored the woundings in his Report, other than by some incidental references.

The particular forensic test used to determine whether any of the known dead had Wred a weapon is subject to too many limitations to justify any positive findings. This test is not preferred by major crime laboratories anywhere. Thus, Lord Widgery's conclusion that "there is strong suspicion that some (of the known dead) had been carrying weapons or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and yet others had been closely supporting them" is without reliable scientific foundation.

"Justice Denied" Main