Lord Widgery discusses this question in the context of his interpretation of the order to 1 Para to begin its scoop-up operation--permitting the troops to penetrate down Rossville Street as far as the Rossville Flats. He neither approffes nor condemns the decision to launch this kind of arrest operation. At best, one can find in the careful language used by Lord Widgery a determination that it was an exercise of bad judgment on the part of the brigade commander to have sent the paratroopers into an area where there was such a large accumulation of civilians, which included a mingling of some of the rioters who had been at barrier 14, peaceable marchers, sightseers, journalists and some passers-by.

Although, in his summary of conclusions, Lord Widgery finds that the Brigade Commander, Brigadier MacLellan, may have underestimated the hazard to civilians created by the arrest operation, he finds no fault with the Commanding Officer of 1 Para, Lieutenant Colonel Wilford, who, he concludes, acted within his orders. Yet, as Lord Widgery concedes, the record shows that Brigadier MacLellan was not fully informed of the makeup of the crowd in the arrest operation area. But Lieutenant Colonel Wilford, being on the spot, was aware that many innocent civilians would be aVected by a scoop-up operation. Instead of reporting back to brigade command the situation as it existed on the ground, the commanding Officer of 1 Para went straight ahead with his scoop-up operation. Apparently Lord Widgery is not troubled by this, because the commanding Officer of 1 Para was acting under orders.

Lord Widgery stops too short in his evaluation of the justification for launching the scoop-up operation. According to the original brigade commander's plan, this arrest operation was to be confined to picking up rioters in the perimeter area of the Bogside. The march involved thousands of peaceable civilians, whom the army believed would remain within the Bogside in order to avoid a confrontation with the soldiers and police Officers at the barriers. The brigade commander's plan did not contemplate any scoop-up operation down Rossville Street as far as the Rossville Flats.

In fact, up to the last minute, the plan of 1 Para was to cut off the rioters on William Street between Company C and Support Company. But, because of the delay of the soldiers of 1 Para getting through the barriers, the rioters on William Street were alerted to the launching of the arrest operation, and fled down Chamberlain Street and Rossville Street. The situation had now drastically changed. It would appear to be irresponsible, under these circumstances, for the commanding Officer of 1 Para to send his soldiers chasing down Chamberlain Street and Rossville Street in the direction of large numbers of civilians who had not been involved in the rioting, at all. The record shows that Brigadier MacLellan at brigade headquarters, outside the Bogside area, was not aware of this changed situation until the shooting down Rossville Street was practically offer, and did not even know where the soldiers of 1 Para were located, or that any but Company C was involved. Under these circumstances, the "acting under orders" explanation Lord Widgery proffides for the commanding Officer of 1 Para is not supportable.

"Justice Denied" Main