On the bright, sunny Sunday afternoon of January 30, 1972, British paratroopers, using high velocity, selfloading rifles, Wred at a number of civilians in the Bogside area of Londonderry killing 13 of them and wounding another 13. There appears to be little or no parallel in English history to such an event involving British soldiers and British civilians. Parliament immediately adopted a resolution calling for an inquiry into the events which led to this loss of life. The Lord Chief Justice of England, the Right Honorable Lord Widgery was appointed to preside at the Inquiry.

The Tribunal which sat in the County Hall at Coleraine, a small town 30 miles from Londonderry, commenced hearing testimony on February 21 and continued until March 14. During this time 17 sessions were held, at which 114 witnesses gave evidence subject to cross examination. Thereafter three further sessions took place in the Royal Courts of Justice in London at which closing arguments of counsel were heard.

On April 10, 1972, the Lord Chief Justice submitted his Report of the Tribunal. This Report was made public on April 18, 1972.

Perhaps what happened in the Bogside of Londonderry on January 30, 1972 is inextricably bound up in the bitter strife that Northern Ireland has known for many years. But the record amassed during the 20 days of evidence and argument heard by Lord Widgery, as well as other evidence that was available to Lord Widgery, reveal fairly clearly how these specific deaths and woundings occurred. This record also discloses how the military decisions, made prior to January 30, led almost inescapably to the fateful events of that day.

A march participated in by thousands of the Catholic citizens of Londonderry was the occasion for the intervention by the military. Lord Widgery's leadoff finding in his report is that "There would have been no deaths in Londonderry on 30 January if those who organized the illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was almost inevitable." He also Wnds that had the soldiers maintained the same lowkey approach they had followed in previous demonstrations, no killings of civilians would have occurred. However he concludes that there was no general break down in military discipline, and, in the body of his report, Wnds that except in one or two instances, the soldiers Wred on the civilians in the honest, although sometimes mistaken, belief that it was necessary to shoot to protect their lives or the lives of their comrades from threatened hostile action by armed gunmen or bombers.

This report, relying on the written record of the same evidence that Lord Widgery heard and on other evidence that was made available to him, challenges most of Lord Widgery's findings and conclusions which support the good faith of the soldiers, and takes the contrary position that the record of the Inquiry justiWes a finding that in all of the cases of the known dead and wounded, the soldiers Wred either deliberately or recklessly at unarmed civilians.

I. Background of the March Marches had been banned in Northern Ireland since August 9, 1971 under the Special Powers Act of 1922. At 4:00 o'clock in the morning of August 9, under the authority of this Act, British soldiers made sweeping arrests of suspected ira terrorists or Republican activists in a number of Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. Hundreds of men were taken from their homes on that day and on subsequent days and were interned in concentration camps without being charged with or tried for any criminal offense.

Under the Act these men were not entitled to representation by counsel or the traditional writ of habeas corpus. The duration of internment was indeWnite--the release of any individual internee being solely a discretionary act of a goffernment official. One cannot avoid commenting that legislation permitting such arbitrary deprivations of individual liberty is extraordinary, indeed, in the United Kingdom with its proud heritage of Magna Carta.

The internment of Catholic men under the Special Powers Act is directly relevant to the march in the Bogside on January 30, 1972. This march was planned and sponsored by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (nicra) as a specific protest against the internment and the failure of the Stormont goffernment to release the internees, or, in the alternative, to try them for specific criminal offenses. Indeed, the internment policy of the Stormont goffernment was largely responsible for the increased strife in Londonderry from August 9 to the day of the march on January 30, 1972.

Lord Widgery in the opening portions of his report offers a short history of this strife from August 1971 to January 30, 1972 as a basis for proffiding the context of the military action on January 30, 1972. But he completely ignores the subject of internment and the charges of cruel treatment of internees by the military which had been made by nicra and others during this period, and which constituted one of the most significant reasons for the increased hostility against the military by the Catholic civilian population of Londonderry.

The terms of reference originally announced by Lord Widgery for his Inquiry limited in time to an hour on January 30, would have prevented any consideration of this background. Yet Lord Widgery, himself, permitted testimony from the military concerning events in Londonderry between August 1971 and January 30, 1972, and chose to discuss these events in the introductory portion of his report. It is therefore a singular omission on his part that he makes no mention of the internment controffersy which was a principal reason for the gathering of thousands of Londonderry Catholics under the sponsorship of nicra to march on Sunday, January 30.

Lord Widgery was certainly aware of the internment controffersy and could have taken judicial notice of it. Allegations against the military in Northern Ireland of physical brutality in the treatment of internees were the subject of a highly publicized official Home Office inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Edmond Compton. The Compton Report was presented to Parliament in Noffember 1971 and released to the public. It is not germane here to discuss the contents of the Compton Report, except to state that the report absolved the military of any acts of physical brutality or cruelty against the internees.

Lord Widgery only refers to the military testimony, heard by him, which disclosed that the Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland had decided by October 1971 to regain the initiative in the Bogside and Creggan Estates area for the purpose of imposing law and order. He omits any reference to the publication of the Compton Report the following month, which stunned and angered the Londonderry Catholic community, of which the great majority were not involved in any terrorist or hooligan activity against the military.

I. The Military Appraisal of the March Prior to January 30 Chief Superintendent Lagan of the Royal Ulster Constabulatory, the commanding police official in the relevant geographical area where the events of "Bloody Sunday" occurred, was perhaps the most experienced and knowledgeable security official on the question of who in the Catholic community of Londonderry were responsible and peaceable citizens, as distinguished from habitual rioters. He was fully informed by nicra that the march, protesting internment, on January 30 was to be a nonviolent demonstration by a large number of the peaceable Catholic community. It is significant that based on his special experience with the nicra leadership he believed that if the march were permitted to go unchallenged by the military, it would pose no threat of harm to persons or property.

On January 24, 1972, Chief Superintendent Lagan conveyed these views to Brigadier MacLellan, commander of the brigade unit of the military in the Londonderry area. Lagan testified that he not only urged that the military allow the march to take place without military intervention, but that Brigadier MacLellan completely agreed with him and was going to make this same recommendation to General Ford, the Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland. Lagan had no doubt that hooligans might throw stones and bottles at soldiers patrolling the streets. However this was an almost daily event in Londonderry and he recommended that the army take photographs of such rioters for the purpose of making arrests at a later time. He believed that with the size of the crowd that would be marching--estimated between 2,000 and 20,000 people--only serious violence would result if the soldiers sought to intervene at the time of the march. According to the evidence, MacLellan communicated Chief Superintendent Lagan's recommendation to General Ford but it was rejected by Ford, the Stormont goffernment and higher authorities at Westminister.

Chief Superintendent Lagan also testified that on January 30, before the march, he specifically informed General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan that nicra had assured him that the marchers would turn right on Rossville Street from William Street to avoid any confrontation with the soldiers and police Officers at barrier 14. Nicra wanted to preserve order and maintain the march as a nonviolent demonstration. Indeed, it was essential that the march be nonviolent if nicra was to succeed in its goal of leading a digniWed and effective demonstration against internment.

General Ford testified before Lord Widgery that, although it was the view of the military that the bulk of the marchers would be peaceable, the sponsors of the march would not be able to control the hooligan group which was expected to attack the soldiers with an assortment of dangerous missiles, including explosive nail bombs.

There was no dispute in the testimony that on numerous occasions prior to January 30 groups of rowdy young men threw nail bombs at soldiers. A nail bomb is a home made device about the size of a baseball which has a gelignite explosive core. Imbedded nails blow out like shrapnel when the bomb explodes after its fuse is lit. However Chief Superintendent Lagan was convinced that no nail bombs or any weapons would be used by the ira or by any civilians during the nicra march, if the army caused no confrontation.

General Ford also testified that the army believed that a large number of ira terrorists, armed with guns, would be included among the marchers, and that they would use the occasion of the march to shoot at and kill soldiers. Accordingly, General Ford had decided, in consultation with the Stormont goffernment, that the march had to be contained within the Bogside area, and that if any acts of violence were committed against the security forces, arrest operations should be put in motion to take into custody those involved in the violence. The military position was that unless such arrests were made, there would be a breakdown in the respect for law and a continuing threat of violence to the commercial and Protestant communities of Londonderry. General Ford was determined to prevent the marchers from reaching their destination, Guild Hall, in the City Center of Londonderry.

On January 25, General Ford put Brigadier MacLellan in charge of the operation and ordered him to prepare a detailed plan. The brigade commander's plan required the erection of 26 barriers which sealed off the Bogside and Creggan Estates area from the rest of the city. Each barrier was to be manned by an army platoon assisted by ruc Officers. The march was not to be interfered with so long as it was contained in the Bogside. The plan called for the march to be dealt with in as low a key as possible for as long as possible. However, in the event that violence occurred at any barrier which threatened the soldiers or the police Officers with physical harm or being offerrun by the marchers, the soldiers were to respond initially with rubber bullets, water canon and, as a last resort, cs gas.

The troops at the barriers were to be proffided by units regularly under the command of the local infantry brigade. But for this particular march the orders called for reinforcements which included the First Battalion Parachute Regiment (referred to in the testimony and in Lord Widgery's report as 1 Para); the First Battalion King's own Border Regiment and two companies of the Third Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The total number of troops assembled at the borders of the Bogside on Sunday, January 30, 1972 was 1800.

A special proffision in the brigade orders dealt with the treatment of "hooliganism." The plan proffided: "An arrest force is to be held centrally behind the check points and launched in a scoopup operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as possible." It assigned 1 Para to this specific task and proffided that 1 Para "Maintain a Brigade Arrest Force to conduct a scoopup operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible. (a) This operation will only be launched either in whole or in part on the orders of the Brigade Commander. (b) . . . . . . . (c) The scoopup operation is likely to be launched on two axes one directly toward hooligan activity and in the area of William Street--Little Diamond, and one towards the area of William Street--Little James Street (d) It is expected that the arrest operation will be conducted on foot."

Lord Widgery in his report quotes this portion of the brigade plan. But, strangely, the "(c)" portion of these arrest instructions for 1 Para is omitted by him. This omission becomes especially relevant to the issue of whether the paratroopers acted beyond their orders, when the arrest plan was put in operation, by charging further into the Bogside area than was either contemplated by the brigade commander's plan or by any order which may have been given to them to begin the scoopup operation.

At this point it is important to examine the special assignment to 1 Para for this scoopup arrest operation. Such an examination is relevant to the issue of whether the Army knowingly accepted the risk of civilian casualties on January 30. If the Army was sincere in its stated objective to engage in a low key operation for as long as possible and to undertake an arrest operation only under special circumstances limited to hooligans, one must seriously ask the question of why this arrest operation was assigned to the paratroopers. It is clear from the testimony that the brigade commander, himself, did not make this assignment. He testified that General Ford was responsible for it.

Although Lord Widgery prevented counsel for the families of the dead and wounded from probing fully into the prior experience and reputation of this particular paratroop regiment, enough evidence did come before the Tribunal to indicate, at the least, that there was a basis for strong suspicion that 1 Para was unsuited for military action against a demonstrating civilian population, and, at the most, that 1 Para was a hardened, brutal "killer" company that a commander might use effectively in jungle warfare against a dangerous enemy, but which, if unleashed against a hostile civilian population, would use their weapons recklessly, without much concern for the killing or wounding of unarmed civilians. The commanding Officer of this regiment admitted in his testimony that serious allegations had been made against his paratroop company in other towns in Northern Ireland, such as the blinding of an elderly lady in her home by one of the paras shooting a rubber bullet at close range into her face, and the brutal use of gun butts on civilians by some paras while others held the civilians in a defenseless position.

The commanding Officer testified that a military investigation initiated by him had cleared his men of these charges. But a newspaper story was read into the record, quoting British military Officers from other units as calling for the remoffal of 1 Para from Northern Ireland, claiming that this regiment of paratroopers had undone in a very short time much of the good community relations which the military had developed offer months of eVort by the regular military units in Northern Ireland.

Of course the Tribunal could not and should not have established the truth or falsity of such charges. They are mentioned here not for the purpose of supporting their validity. Their basic signiWcance to the inquiry, however, is that they clearly establish that 1 Para had a dubious reputation as to brutality and indiVerence to the safety of Catholic civilians. This reputation alone, had to be considered in determining whether bringing in 1 Para for the scoopup operation created an unacceptable risk in the delicate situation which confronted the military in the Bogside on Sunday, January 30. Lord Widgery does not directly refer to this reputation of 1 Para in his report, but he does allude to the claim made by the families' counsel that 1 Para was known as the "roughest and toughest unit in Northern Ireland," without indicating any disagreement with that characterization. Also, in dealing with the question of why the paratroopers Wred at civilians he states:

"In 1 Para the soldiers are trained to go for the gunman and make their decisions quickly. In these circumstances it is not remarkable that mistakes were made and some innocent civilians hit."

Again in his conclusions, he states, referring to 1 Para,

"Their training made them aggressive and quick in decision and some showed more restraint in opening Wre than others."

Even on Lord Widgery's own characterization of the soldiers in 1 Para, their assignment to the scoopup operation had to be recognized by the commanding Officers in charge as causing a dangerous risk of harm to the civilian population.

The army's explanation of 1 Para's assignment to this scoopup operation seems exceedingly weak. Lord Widgery restates it in his report as follows:

"1 Para was chosen for the arrest role because it was the only experienced uncommitted battalion in Northern Ireland. Other experienced units were stationed in Londonderry as part of the normal content of 8th infantry brigade but being committed to barrier and other duties they were not available for use as an arrest force." The thinness of this explanation is apparent. The Army made preparations for the march on January 30 considerably in advance of that day. It was General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan who utilized the other troops at the barriers and especially assigned 1 Para for the arrest operation. The regular troops of the 8th Infantry Brigade, which had been stationed around the Bogside area for a considerable length of time, knew the geography of the Bogside and had experience with rioters in the past. Because of the number of civilians in the streets of the Bogside on January 30, these regular troops would have been much better suited for the arrest operation.

The paratroopers could have been assigned to the barriers armed with baton guns, which Wre rubber bullets, and also with cs gas. Perhaps the soundest military decision would have been to not have 1 Para in Londonderry at all that day. In judging whether the military decision to use 1 Para for the arrest operation was reckless, an analogy may be helpful. The United States Special Forces, the "Green Berets," like 1 Para are trained to kill and to be fast on the trigger. Their mission is to combat a dangerous enemy, not a civilian population. Using the "Green Berets" for the "scoopup" of civilians at the Mayday demonstrations in Washington, D.C. in 1971 would have been similar to the use of 1 Para in Londonderry on January 30, with possibly the same tragic consequences.

The March as it Happened

For the reader to follow the sequence of events, from the beginning of the march through the late afternoon, when the dead and wounded were carried away, he must have information about the street plan of Londonderry where the events took place, including the location of specific buildings and places to which reference must be made. A map showing all the relevant streets and places is included at the end of this report. We have borrowed this map from The Sunday Times, which printed it on April 23, 1972 in connection with its "Insight on Bloody Sunday" publication. The reader is cautioned that references on the map to ira positions and to certain locations for dead or wounded civilians are based on the independent investigations of "Insight" reporters for the Times and are not intended to reflect the evidence before the Widgery Tribunal. For the purposes of this report they should be disregarded. The map is helpful primarily to show the street plan of the Bogside and the location of certain buildings and places referred to repeatedly in this report.

William Street serves roughly as a northern perimeter of the Bogside area. From the Creggan Estate area, where the marchers assembled, which is adjacent to the Bogside in a westerly direction, the plan of march was to follow William Street straight to Guild Hall at City Center which is outside the Bogside area and off the map.

If the marchers had followed the plan they would have passed Rossville Street which is the main street of the Bogside and comes off William Street on the right hand side of the line of the march, and they would have passed Chamberlain Street which runs parallel to Rossville Street. Just past Chamberlain Street was barrier 14 manned by soldiers and ruc Officers to prevent the marchers from leaving the Bogside and going to Guild Hall at the City Center. At the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, running north from the line of the march, is Little James Street. Half way up Little James Street was barrier 12 also manned by soldiers and ruc Officers to keep the marchers within the Bogside area. Barrier 13 was close to barrier 12 on Sackville Street, which runs east from Little James Street north of William Street. We will leave till later a description of Rossville Street and the buildings and places on either side of Rossville Street which played a significant part in the events of "Bloody Sunday." One can hardly improffe on the following description by Lord Widgery in his report of the march itself based on the evidence he heard.

"The marchers assembled on the Creggan Estate on a fine sunny afternoon and in carnival mood. At first amounting to some hundreds only they toured the estate collecting additional numbers as they went and eventually the total may have been something between 3,000 and 5,000 people. At their head was a lorry carrying a Civil Rights Association banner and traveling upon the lorry were some of the leaders of the march. (reference to a photograph in evidence). The marchers did not moffe in any kind of military formation but walked as a crowd through the streets, occupying the entire width of the road, both carriageway and pavements. The marchers, who included many women and some children, were orderly and in the main good humored. (reference to a photograph in evidence). When in due course they appeared at the west end of William Street it was obvious that their direct route to the Guildhall Square lay along William Street itself and that the march would come face to face with the Army at barrier 14 in that street. At this stage it became noticeable that a large number of youths of what was described throughout the Inquiry as the hooligan type, had placed themselves at the head of the march; indeed some of them were in front of the lorry itself. (reference to a photograph in evidence). Some relatively minor exchanges took place between these youths and the soldiers manning the barriers which the march passed on its way to William Street, but nothing of real consequence occurred until the marchers reached the barriers in Little James Street and William Street. When the leaders of the march reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street the lorry turned to its right to go along Rossville Street and the stewards made strenuous efforts to persuade the marchers to follow the lorry. It is quite evident now that the leaders of the march had decided before setting off from the Creggan Estate that they would take this course and thus avoid a headon confrontation with the Army at the William Street barrier." The worst trouble of the afternoon began when about 200 young marchers (accompanied by some older ones) refused to follow the instructions of the leaders of the march to turn right on Rossville Street for the purpose of avoiding a confrontation with barrier 14 straight ahead on William Street. This large group of people, referred to as "hooligans" by the soldiers, marched on barrier 14 and began to throw bricks, angle irons, bottles and others debris at the soldiers. No soldier was injured by this attack primarily because of the protective gear worn by the soldiers and the coffer they were able to take behind parked army trucks.

The soldiers responded to this attack by firing rubber bullets at the rioters. The rioters fell back but returned hiding behind large, improffised metal shields protecting them from the rubber bullets. At this point the army brought up a water canon which shot, under great pressure, a mixture of water and purple dye at the rioters. The water canon was successful in sweeping many of the rioters down William Street and preventing any further effective action by the rioters against barrier 14.

This entire scene was filmed by television cameramen from the BBC and the Independent Television News and clearly shows that the rioters' attack on barrier 14 was vicious but involved no explosive weapons, and reveals the effectiveness of the military response. At this point in the afternoon the Army had successfully contained the march within the Bogside by the use of the barriers and antiriot equipment, without any resulting injuries either to the rioters or to the soldiers. The time was now 3:55 in the afternoon, or as recorded by the Army, 15:55 hours.

It is at this time that 1 Para decided to seek authority to begin its assigned arrest role.

The Launching of the Arrest Operation

As referred to earlier, the brigade commander's plan for this day contemplated a scoopup operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as possible by 1 Para, should violence be used against the security forces, which were the soldiers and ruc Officers at the barriers. Certainly the acts of the rioters at barrier 14 justiWed implementing this scoopup operation within the terms of the plan. However, it is important to remember that the brigade commander's plan, which was approffed by General Ford, specifically proffided that: "the scoopup operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed toward hooligan activity in the area of William Street--Little Diamond and one toward the area of William Street--Little James Street."Thus, this arrest operation was always planned to be a limited one, carried out on the perimeter of the Bogside area. No proffision of the brigade commander's plan gave any authorization for penetration down Rossville Street further into the Bogside area itself. Had 1 Para followed this original plan and remained within the perimeter area of the Bogside, it is unlikely civilians would have been killed or wounded on January 30.

The fact is that the Support Company of 1 Para advanced rapidly through barrier 12 down Rossville Street all the way to the Rossville Flats, a modern highrise apartment complex consisting of three wings in the form of a "U." Company C of 1 Para went through barrier 14 and penetrated the Bogside down Chamberlain Street which runs parallel to Rossville Street. Except for two civilians wounded near William Street, all of the Army shooting, and the killing and wounding of the civilians occurred in this general area of the Bogside around the Rossville Flats on the east side of Rossville Street, on Rossville Street itself and in the Glenfada Park area and Abbey Park area on the west side of Rossville Street.

A central question for the Widgery Tribunal was whether this change of the brigade commander's plan, and the invasion of the Bogside by 1 Para down Rossville Street for a scoopup operation, had been authorized by orders from the brigade brigadier as was clearly required. To answer this question one can turn to four sources of information: (1) the brigade commander's plan itself; (2) the brigade log which recorded minute by minute during the operations on January 30, all messages coming into and going out of brigade headquarters, including all orders from the brigade commander; (3) the testimony of Chief Superintendent Lagan who was located in the brigade commander's Office at brigade headquarters, located in a building outside of the Bogside, and who was in constant touch with the brigade commander and (4) the testimony of the commanding Officers in charge of operations that Sunday afternoon and of the brigade major, who transmitted the brigade commander's orders and offersaw the keeping of the brigade log.

A.The Brigade Commander's Plan--We have already referred to the proffision in the brigade commander's plan which contemplated a scoopup arrest operation limited to the William Street--Little Diamond and to the William Street--Little James Street area. This operation would be confined to the perimeter area of the Bogside and would not permit an arrest operation further into the Bogside area itself. This plan also proffided that the arrest operation would "only be launched either in whole or in part on the orders of the brigade commander." Thus any change in the plan, especially so drastic a departure as a moffement of troops into the Bogside down Rossville Street, required the specific orders of the brigade commander.

B.The Brigade Log--The brigade log, which was kept by an army Officer at brigade headquarters, recorded all radio and telephone messages coming in and going out of brigade headquarters. He also recorded messages offer a secure link, which was a special connection proffiding protection against eavesdropping for army communications that required secrecy.

If the brigade log record was accurately kept, any order of the brigade commander authorizing 1 Para to engage in a scoopup operation down Rossville Street in the Bogside area would be recorded in this log. There is no such entry. On the contrary, the log entries relating to the initiation of the scoopup operation reveal clearly that 1 Para was not authorized to engage in such a scoopup operation. Beginning at 15:55 hours, the time when soldiers at barrier 14 had successfully dispersed the rioters by means of the water canon, the brigade log entries show the following:

"Serial 147, 15:55 hours from 1 Para. would like to deploy subunit through barricade 14 to pick up Yobbos in William Street Little James Street."

"Serial 159, 16:09 hours from brigade major. Orders given to 1 Para at 16:07 hours for one subunit of 1 Para to do scoopup through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street."(Emphasis in original)

"Serial 164, 16:13 hours Brava 3 (Company C) at Aggro Corner (William Street and Rossville Street) ordered to return to initial location." (parenthetical explanations supplied).

The brigade commander and the brigade major explained that these log entries were brief notes of much fuller radio messages. Counsel for the families of the dead and wounded produced a transcript of a tape recording of the relevant complete radio messages that were received and sent at brigade headquarters. The transcript of the message from 1 Para which corresponds to brigade log entry serial 147 at 15:55 hours reads as follows:

"I would like to deploy one of his subunits to barrier 14 around the back into the area of William Street, Little James Street. He reckons if he does he should be able to pick up quite a number of Yobbos."

There is no transcript of a tape recording for a radio message corresponding to brigade log serial 159 at 16:09 hours, purporting to note an order permitting the scoopup operation. The absence of a recording of this order from brigade command is explained by the brigade major, who testified he transmitted the order, on the ground that he used the secure link, which was the secret communication connection between the brigade commander's headquarters and 1 Para.

The transcription of the tape recording which corresponds to the brigade log entry serial 164 at 16:13 hours reads as follows:

"(From brigade command to 1 Para) During that moffe through serial 14 did you in fact conduct any scoopup offer."

"(From 1 Para to brigade command) I will get the information for you, offer."

"(From brigade command to 1 Para) If you have not conducted any scoopup then you should return your call sign Brava 3 back to its original position for further operation, offer."

Then, a little later in the transcript, the following radio message from brigade command to 1 Para was recorded:

"Hello 65 (1 Para) this is Zero (brigade command) You were given instructions some time ago to moffe Brava 3 (Company C) from the area of William Street, Rossville Street back to its original location, is this now complete, offer."

These brigade log entries alone, and the supporting transcript of the recorded radio messages, which constitute a contemporary record of what was being requested of the brigade commander and what was being ordered by the brigade commander on that Sunday afternoon, tell an exceedingly important story. At 3:55 in the afternoon 1 Para was ready to assume its scoopup assignment, but limited its request to the sending of Company C through barrier 14 to pick up rioters in the short space down William Street to Little James Street. This request was quite consistent with the original brigade commander's plan.

According to the brigade commander's testimony, 1 Paras request to begin its scoopup operation was initially refused, although there is no log entry indicating this. The brigade log entry serial 159 shows that 12 minutes later, at 4:07 p.m., the brigade commander approffed this limited scoopup operation. But this order contained a significantly relevant restriction. While permitting the scoopup operation to begin, the order specifically stated, "Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street." The underscoring of this restriction of 1 Paras operations appears in the original brigade log entry--if this order was in fact given by the brigade commander, it seems obvious that he was sticking to his original plan, and was prohibiting 1 Para to engage in any troop moffement down Rossville Street.

The third entry, serial 164 at 16:13 hours, recording an order from the brigade commander to Company C of 1 Para to return to their original position, is consistent with the two prior entries. The transcript of the recording of the radio messages between brigade command headquarters and 1 Para suggest that the brigade commander was experiencing anxiety offer the activities of the troops of Company C of 1 Para. Only six minutes after his order to Company C to moffe forward through barrier 14 down William Street for a scoopup operation, his headquarters was inquiring whether Company C had made any arrest, and ordering Company C back to its original position. Not receiving any reply from Company C, brigade command sent a more urgent message, reminding Company C of its earlier instructions to return to its original position, and asking whether they have complied.

It is important to note that, if an order was given by brigade command, only Company C of 1 Para was authorized to engage in any scoopup operation by that order. There is no order recorded anywhere in the brigade log authorizing Support Company of 1 Para to engage in a scoopup arrest operation, or to leave its position at barrier 12. It was Support Company which Wred every single one of the Army live rounds that day. Thus, on the basis of the brigade log entries, themselves, the troops of Company C and Support Company of 1 Para advanced down Rossville Street and Chamberlain Street in the Bogside not only without authorization, but in violation of a specific brigade command order not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street.

A.Testimony of Chief Superintendent Lagan Chief Superintendent Lagan was in the brigade commander's Office during the entire afternoon of January 30, and was in constant contact with Brigadier MacLellan, the brigade commander. He testified that MacLellan spoke to him shortly after 3:55 p.m. and told him, "The Paras want to go in." Lagan interpreted the manner in which MacLellan gave him this information as an invitation to express his view on the matter. He said he told MacLellan, "For Heaven's sake, hold them until we're satisWed that the marchers and the rioters are well separated." MacLellan then left him, and returned to tell him, "Sorry, the paras have gone in."

Lagan testified it was his clear impression that MacLellan had not authorized the paras to engage in the scoopup operation, but was merely telling him about the accomplished fact with an air of resignation. Lagan withstood vigorous cross examination by counsel for the Army who sought to have him concede that MacLellan was merely seeking to console him when MacLellan informed him that the paras had gone in, and was not indicating that he had not, himself, ordered this operation. Lagan steadfastly insisted that it was his impression that MacLellan was indicating to him that the paras had not gone in on the basis of his orders.

The record makes it clear that Lagan and MacLellan shared similar views concerning the military strategy for that afternoon. There is evidence that both were apprehensive offer the use of the paratroopers for an arrest operation. Lagan's presence in MacLellan's Office throughout that afternoon and his frequent consultations with MacLellan lend credibility to his 'testimony that he believed that MacLellan would have notiWed him before sending an order to the paratroopers, authorizing them to begin a scoopup operation--especially after he had so vehemently urged MacLellan not to send them in.

The absence of a tape recording of the order noted in brigade log entry serial 159 supports Lagan's position. MacLellan's explanation that the use by his brigade major of the secure link to transmit this order precluded a tape recording of the message is open to question. The paratroopers, themselves, had already used the regular radio to request permission to begin their scoopup operation, thereby tipping off whoever might be listening in that the paratroopers were ready to go in. Under these circumstances the use of the secure link would appear to be unnecessary.

If MacLellan did not give the order, who might have given it? The record supplies a possible answer as to Company C--none, whatsoever, as to Support Company. General Ford who had, himself, assigned 1 Para to the arrest operation, testified that he was with Company C of 1 Para behind barrier 14 just prior to their going in for the scoopup operation. He admitted, during his examination by counsel for the Army that when Company C of 1 Para went through barrier 14, he spoke to the leading platoon and said to them, "Go on, 1 Para, go and get them, and good luck." On cross examination by counsel for the families of the dead and wounded, General Ford stated that he was not informed of any orders delivered to Company C before they went in. He denied, however, that he gave any order for the scoopup operation.

Testimony of the Brigade Commander, the Brigade Major and the Commanding officer of 1 Para

Chief Superintendent Lagan was in the brigade commander's Office during the entire afternoon of January 30, and was in constant contact with Brigadier MacLellan, the brigade commander. He testified that MacLellan spoke to him shortly after 3:55 p.m. and told him, "The Paras want to go in." Lagan interpreted the manner in which MacLellan gave him this information as an invitation to express his view on the matter. He said he told MacLellan, "For Heaven's sake, hold them until we're satisWed that the marchers and the rioters are well separated." MacLellan then left him, and returned to tell him, "Sorry, the paras have gone in."

Lagan testified it was his clear impression that MacLellan had not authorized the paras to engage in the scoopup operation, but was merely telling him about the accomplished fact with an air of resignation. Lagan withstood vigorous cross examination by counsel for the Army who sought to have him concede that MacLellan was merely seeking to console him when MacLellan informed him that the paras had gone in, and was not indicating that he had not, himself, ordered this operation. Lagan steadfastly insisted that it was his impression that MacLellan was indicating to him that the paras had not gone in on the basis of his orders.

The record makes it clear that Lagan and MacLellan shared similar views concerning the military strategy for that afternoon. There is evidence that both were apprehensive offer the use of the paratroopers for an arrest operation. Lagan's presence in MacLellan's Office throughout that afternoon and his frequent consultations with MacLellan lend credibility to his 'testimony that he believed that MacLellan would have notiWed him before sending an order to the paratroopers, authorizing them to begin a scoopup operation--especially after he had so vehemently urged MacLellan not to send them in.

The absence of a tape recording of the order noted in brigade log entry serial 159 supports Lagan's position. MacLellan's explanation that the use by his brigade major of the secure link to transmit this order precluded a tape recording of the message is open to question. The paratroopers, themselves, had already used the regular radio to request permission to begin their scoopup operation, thereby tipping off whoever might be listening in that the paratroopers were ready to go in. Under these circumstances the use of the secure link would appear to be unnecessary.

If MacLellan did not give the order, who might have given it? The record supplies a possible answer as to Company C--none, whatsoever, as to Support Company. General Ford who had, himself, assigned 1 Para to the arrest operation, testified that he was with Company C of 1 Para behind barrier 14 just prior to their going in for the scoopup operation. He admitted, during his examination by counsel for the Army that when Company C of 1 Para went through barrier 14, he spoke to the leading platoon and said to them, "Go on, 1 Para, go and get them, and good luck." On cross examination by counsel for the families of the dead and wounded, General Ford stated that he was not informed of any orders delivered to Company C before they went in. He denied, however, that he gave any order for the scoopup operation.

Testimony of the Brigade Commander, the Brigade Major and the Commanding officer of 1 Para Brigade Commander MacLellan--

MacLellan testified that he had, in fact, given the order entered in the brigade log as serial 159. He also interpreted it as authorizing both Company C and Support Company of 1 Para (even though the latter was not at barrier 14, the only barrier mentioned in the order) to enter the Bogside to engage in a scoopup arrest operation, based on their own assessment of what was necessary on the ground at that time. He explained his limitation of "not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street" to mean that he did not want the soldiers of 1 Para to go beyond the Rossville Flats to Free Derry Corner, which was at the very end of Rossville Street, where the nicra sponsors were holding a meeting. MacLellan's testimony conXicts with his original brigade commander's plan and the plain meaning of the words of the order entered in the brigade log as serial 159. It is also not in harmony with the contemporary expressions of his views to Chief Superintendent Lagan, as related by Lagan.

Perhaps, one must accept Brigadier MacLellan's testimony in the context in which it was given. At the time of the Widgery Inquiry, 13 civilians had been killed and 13 had been wounded by the soldiers of 1 Para, who had gone down Rossville Street in the Bogside for their scoopup operation. Even if General Ford had given the order, could MacLellan be expected to repudiate his commanding Officer? Or, if 1 Para had acted without orders at all, would MacLellan's basic loyalty to the Army, or his concern for the reputation of the British goffernment, permit him to expose such shocking conduct, especially after the tragic events of January 30? These questions are put not to require a conclusion, but solely to indicate that this crucial question of orders was not resolved by the Tribunal Inquiry, and certainly not by Lord Widgery's report.

"Justice Denied" Main