As referred to earlier, the brigade commander's plan for this day contemplated a scoopup operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as possible by 1 Para, should violence be used against the security forces, which were the soldiers and ruc officers at the barriers. Certainly the acts of the rioters at barrier 14 justified implementing this scoopup operation within the terms of the plan. However, it is important to remember that the brigade commander's plan, which was approffed by General Ford, specifically proffided that: "the scoopup operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed toward hooligan activity in the area of William Street--Little Diamond and one toward the area of William Street--Little James Street."Thus, this arrest operation was always planned to be a limited one, carried out on the perimeter of the Bogside area. No proffision of the brigade commander's plan gave any authorization for penetration down Rossville Street further into the Bogside area itself. Had 1 Para followed this original plan and remained within the perimeter area of the Bogside, it is unlikely civilians would have been killed or wounded on January 30.

The fact is that the Support Company of 1 Para advanced rapidly through barrier 12 down Rossville Street all the way to the Rossville Flats, a modern highrise apartment complex consisting of three wings in the form of a "U." Company C of 1 Para went through barrier 14 and penetrated the Bogside down Chamberlain Street which runs parallel to Rossville Street. Except for two civilians wounded near William Street, all of the Army shooting, and the killing and wounding of the civilians occurred in this general area of the Bogside around the Rossville Flats on the east side of Rossville Street, on Rossville Street itself and in the Glenfada Park area and Abbey Park area on the west side of Rossville Street.

A central question for the Widgery Tribunal was whether this change of the brigade commander's plan, and the invasion of the Bogside by 1 Para down Rossville Street for a scoopup operation, had been authorized by orders from the brigade brigadier as was clearly required. To answer this question one can turn to four sources of information: (1) the brigade commander's plan itself; (2) the brigade log which recorded minute by minute during the operations on January 30, all messages coming into and going out of brigade headquarters, including all orders from the brigade commander; (3) the testimony of Chief Superintendent Lagan who was located in the brigade commander's office at brigade headquarters, located in a building outside of the Bogside, and who was in constant touch with the brigade commander and (4) the testimony of the commanding officers in charge of operations that Sunday afternoon and of the brigade major, who transmitted the brigade commander's orders and offersaw the keeping of the brigade log.

1.The Brigade Commander's Plan--We have already referred to the proffision in the brigade commander's plan which contemplated a scoopup arrest operation limited to the William Street--Little Diamond and to the William Street--Little James Street area. This operation would be confined to the perimeter area of the Bogside and would not permit an arrest operation further into the Bogside area itself. This plan also proffided that the arrest operation would "only be launched either in whole or in part on the orders of the brigade commander." Thus any change in the plan, especially so drastic a departure as a moffement of troops into the Bogside down Rossville Street, required the specific orders of the brigade commander.

2. The Brigade Log--The brigade log, which was kept by an army officer at brigade headquarters, recorded all radio and telephone messages coming in and going out of brigade headquarters. He also recorded messages offer a secure link, which was a special connection proffiding protection against eavesdropping for army communications that required secrecy.

If the brigade log record was accurately kept, any order of the brigade commander authorizing 1 Para to engage in a scoopup operation down Rossville Street in the Bogside area would be recorded in this log. There is no such entry. On the contrary, the log entries relating to the initiation of the scoopup operation reveal clearly that 1 Para was not authorized to engage in such a scoopup operation. Beginning at 15:55 hours, the time when soldiers at barrier 14 had successfully dispersed the rioters by means of the water canon, the brigade log entries show the following:

"Serial 147, 15:55 hours from 1 Para. would like to deploy subunit through barricade 14 to pick up Yobbos in William Street Little James Street."

"Serial 159, 16:09 hours from brigade major. Orders given to 1 Para at 16:07 hours for one subunit of 1 Para to do scoopup through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street."(Emphasis in original)

"Serial 164, 16:13 hours Brava 3 (Company C) at Aggro Corner (William Street and Rossville Street) ordered to return to initial location." (parenthetical explanations supplied).

The brigade commander and the brigade major explained that these log entries were brief notes of much fuller radio messages. Counsel for the families of the dead and wounded produced a transcript of a tape recording of the relevant complete radio messages that were received and sent at brigade headquarters. The transcript of the message from 1 Para which corresponds to brigade log entry serial 147 at 15:55 hours reads as follows:

"I would like to deploy one of his subunits to barrier 14 around the back into the area of William Street, Little James Street. He reckons if he does he should be able to pick up quite a number of Yobbos."

There is no transcript of a tape recording for a radio message corresponding to brigade log serial 159 at 16:09 hours, purporting to note an order permitting the scoopup operation. The absence of a recording of this order from brigade command is explained by the brigade major, who testifed he transmitted the order, on the ground that he used the secure link, which was the secret communication connection between the brigade commander's headquarters and 1 Para.

The transcription of the tape recording which corresponds to the brigade log entry serial 164 at 16:13 hours reads as follows:

"(From brigade command to 1 Para) During that moffe through serial 14 did you in fact conduct any scoopup offer."

"(From 1 Para to brigade command) I will get the information for you, offer."

"(From brigade command to 1 Para) If you have not conducted any scoopup then you should return your call sign Brava 3 back to its original position for further operation, offer."

Then, a little later in the transcript, the following radio message from brigade command to 1 Para was recorded:

"Hello 65 (1 Para) this is Zero (brigade command) You were given instructions some time ago to moffe Brava 3 (Company C) from the area of William Street, Rossville Street back to its original location, is this now complete, offer."

These brigade log entries alone, and the supporting transcript of the recorded radio messages, which constitute a contemporary record of what was being requested of the brigade commander and what was being ordered by the brigade commander on that Sunday afternoon, tell an exceedingly important story. At 3:55 in the afternoon 1 Para was ready to assume its scoopup assignment, but limited its request to the sending of Company C through barrier 14 to pick up rioters in the short space down William Street to Little James Street. This request was quite consistent with the original brigade commander's plan.

According to the brigade commander's testimony, 1 Paras request to begin its scoopup operation was initially refused, although there is no log entry indicating this. The brigade log entry serial 159 shows that 12 minutes later, at 4:07 p.m., the brigade commander approffed this limited scoopup operation. But this order contained a significantly relevant restriction. While permitting the scoopup operation to begin, the order specifically stated, "Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street." The underscoring of this restriction of 1 Paras operations appears in the original brigade log entry--if this order was in fact given by the brigade commander, it seems obvious that he was sticking to his original plan, and was prohibiting 1 Para to engage in any troop moffement down Rossville Street.

The third entry, serial 164 at 16:13 hours, recording an order from the brigade commander to Company C of 1 Para to return to their original position, is consistent with the two prior entries. The transcript of the recording of the radio messages between brigade command headquarters and 1 Para suggest that the brigade commander was experiencing anxiety offer the activities of the troops of Company C of 1 Para. Only six minutes after his order to Company C to moffe forward through barrier 14 down William Street for a scoopup operation, his headquarters was inquiring whether Company C had made any arrest, and ordering Company C back to its original position. Not receiving any reply from Company C, brigade command sent a more urgent message, reminding Company C of its earlier instructions to return to its original position, and asking whether they have complied.

It is important to note that, if an order was given by brigade command, only Company C of 1 Para was authorized to engage in any scoopup operation by that order. There is no order recorded anywhere in the brigade log authorizing Support Company of 1 Para to engage in a scoopup arrest operation, or to leave its position at barrier 12. It was Support Company which Wred every single one of the Army live rounds that day. Thus, on the basis of the brigade log entries, themselves, the troops of Company C and Support Company of 1 Para advanced down Rossville Street and Chamberlain Street in the Bogside not only without authorization, but in violation of a specific brigade command order not to conduct a running battle down Rossville Street.

3.Testimony of Chief Superintendent LaganChief Superintendent Lagan was in the brigade commander's office during the entire afternoon of January 30, and was in constant contact with Brigadier MacLellan, the brigade commander. He testifed that MacLellan spoke to him shortly after 3:55 p.m. and told him, "The Paras want to go in." Lagan interpreted the manner in which MacLellan gave him this information as an invitation to express his view on the matter. He said he told MacLellan, "For Heaven's sake, hold them until we're satisWed that the marchers and the rioters are well separated." MacLellan then left him, and returned to tell him, "Sorry, the paras have gone in."

Lagan testifed it was his clear impression that MacLellan had not authorized the paras to engage in the scoopup operation, but was merely telling him about the accomplished fact with an air of resignation. Lagan withstood vigorous cross examination by counsel for the Army who sought to have him concede that MacLellan was merely seeking to console him when MacLellan informed him that the paras had gone in, and was not indicating that he had not, himself, ordered this operation. Lagan steadfastly insisted that it was his impression that MacLellan was indicating to him that the paras had not gone in on the basis of his orders.

The record makes it clear that Lagan and MacLellan shared similar views concerning the military strategy for that afternoon. There is evidence that both were apprehensive offer the use of the paratroopers for an arrest operation. Lagan's presence in MacLellan's office throughout that afternoon and his frequent consultations with MacLellan lend credibility to his testimony that he believed that MacLellan would have notiWed him before sending an order to the paratroopers, authorizing them to begin a scoopup operation--especially after he had so vehemently urged MacLellan not to send them in.

The absence of a tape recording of the order noted in brigade log entry serial 159 supports Lagan's position. MacLellan's explanation that the use by his brigade major of the secure link to transmit this order precluded a tape recording of the message is open to question. The paratroopers, themselves, had already used the regular radio to request permission to begin their scoopup operation, thereby tipping off whoever might be listening in that the paratroopers were ready to go in. Under these circumstances the use of the secure link would appear to be unnecessary.

If MacLellan did not give the order, who might have given it? The record supplies a possible answer as to Company C--none, whatsoever, as to Support Company. General Ford who had, himself, assigned 1 Para to the arrest operation, testifed that he was with Company C of 1 Para behind barrier 14 just prior to their going in for the scoopup operation. He admitted, during his examination by counsel for the Army that when Company C of 1 Para went through barrier 14, he spoke to the leading platoon and said to them, "Go on, 1 Para, go and get them, and good luck." On cross examination by counsel for the families of the dead and wounded, General Ford stated that he was not informed of any orders delivered to Company C before they went in. He denied, however, that he gave any order for the scoopup operation.

4.Testimony of the Brigade Commander, the Brigade Major and the Commanding officer of 1 Para (a) Brigade Commander MacLellan--

MacLellan testifed that he had, in fact, given the order entered in the brigade log as serial 159. He also interpreted it as authorizing both Company C and Support Company of 1 Para (even though the latter was not at barrier 14, the only barrier mentioned in the order) to enter the Bogside to engage in a scoopup arrest operation, based on their own assessment of what was necessary on the ground at that time. He explained his limitation of "not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street" to mean that he did not want the soldiers of 1 Para to go beyond the Rossville Flats to Free Derry Corner, which was at the very end of Rossville Street, where the nicra sponsors were holding a meeting. MacLellan's testimony conflicts with his original brigade commander's plan and the plain meaning of the words of the order entered in the brigade log as serial 159. It is also not in harmony with the contemporary expressions of his views to Chief Superintendent Lagan, as related by Lagan.

Perhaps, one must accept Brigadier MacLellan's testimony in the context in which it was given. At the time of the Widgery Inquiry, 13 civilians had been killed and 13 had been wounded by the soldiers of 1 Para, who had gone down Rossville Street in the Bogside for their scoopup operation. Even if General Ford had given the order, could MacLellan be expected to repudiate his commanding officer? Or, if 1 Para had acted without orders at all, would MacLellan's basic loyalty to the Army, or his concern for the reputation of the British goffernment, permit him to expose such shocking conduct, especially after the tragic events of January 30? These questions are put not to require a conclusion, but solely to indicate that this crucial question of orders was not resolved by the Tribunal Inquiry, and certainly not by Lord Widgery's report.

(b) The Brigade Major

--The brigade major testifed that, under the brigade commander's direction, he issued the order to 1 Para to begin its scoop-up operation, which is reXected in brigade command log entry serial 159, and that he supervised the entry in the brigade command log. He said that, although the log entry appeared to authorize only Company C to go in and make arrests, he understood from the brigade commander's plan, that three companies, including Support Company of 1 Para, were expected to participate in arrest operations. Therefore, despite his supervision of the brigade log, he questioned the accuracy of this oYcial log entry. He also denied that any order was given to Company C to return to its original position, despite the specified brigade log entry of such an order, and the language of the transcript of the tape recording of the radio message from brigade command clearly giving this order. His explanation was that this was not an order to Company C, but merely a suggestion on his part.

(c) Commanding Officer of 1 Para, Lieutenant Colonel Wilford

-- Wilford testifed that he did receive the specified order recorded in the brigade log as serial 159. But, he, also, interpreted the language of "not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street" as merely restricting 1 Para from going too far down Rossville Street, past the Rossville Flats, to Free Derry Corner, where the marchers were assembling for a meeting. Wilford did not recall receiving any order instructing Company C to return to its original position. He acknowledged that the only order appearing in the brigade log authorizing an arrest operation, speciWed Company C, and not Support Company. But he stated he gave the orders to Support Company, since they were under his command, and he understood they were to participate in the arrest operation. This action, on his part, however, would be in violation of the brigade commander's plan which clearly speciWed that the order for the arrest operation could only be given by the brigade commander.

Lord Widgery, in his report, briefly discusses this issue of the orders and the dilemma posed by the entries in the brigade command log. He resolves the questions involved by accepting the explanation of the brigade commander, the brigade major and the commanding officer of 1 Para, and concludes, as "the most likely explanation," that brigade command log entry serial 159 must have been mistakenly prepared by the logkeeper. He Wnds the language in the order permitting the deployment of only one company inconsistent with the original brigade commander's plan, which had contemplated the use of three companies. This finding fails to recognize the common human experience of original plans becoming irrelevant in the light of actual events. It is also inconsistent with all the messages following this brigade log entry, which support its specified reference to only Company C. However, Lord Widgery still concludes that Company C and Support Company of 1 Para acted under orders given by Brigade Commander MacLellan, and that these orders permitted the kind of a scoop-up operation that 1 Para, in fact, carried out on January 30.

"Justice Denied" Main